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Preface 
The  primary  goal  of  the  International  Labour  Organisation  (ILO)  is  to 
contribute, with member States, to achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including for women and young people, a goal embedded in 
the ILO 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and more 
recently  re-iterated  in  the  Recovery  from  the  Crisis:  A  Global  Jobs  Pact 
negotiated  during  the  International  Labour  Conference  in  June  2009.  The 
commitment  to  this  goal  has  been  widely  adopted  by  the  international 
community. 
 
This goal is more challenging today than ever given the impact on jobs and 
working conditions of the global economic and financial crisis. The magnitude 
and nature of the impact of the crisis, and the transmission channels through 
which it affects workers and households varies widely between countries. ILO 
is committed to supporting countries such as Liberia and its social partners to 
assess the crisis impact, and to determine options for policy responses. Indeed 
this is a central objective of the Global Jobs Pact, and this report is a reflection 
of this commitment. 
 
Liberia is the first African country to undertake a full assessment of the impact 
of the crisis on employment with ILO support. The recently published Guide
1 
provided the basic methodology for determining the approach, and we wish to 
extend  our  appreciation  to  the  many  national  stakeholders  and  development 
partners who took part in the process. Liberia is facing an important cross-road 
in its development strategy given the impact of the crisis on both employment 
and incomes, and on public and private revenues. Strategic choices will need to 
be  made  in  light  of  the  increasingly  constrained  resource  envelop  for 
development.  Alignment  of  the  activities  of  the  many  development  partners 
with these choices in order to ensure  maximum impact under these difficult 
circumstances should be actively encouraged. Inclusive job-rich growth needs 
to be squarely and firmly in the focus, and strong support by the international 
community towards reaching HIPC completion point is a necessary prerequisite 
for  getting  on  a  sound  development  path.  Liberia’s  support  from  the 
international community and its credibility remains unabated, and it is ILO’s 
intention for this report to illustrate our continuing commitment to being an 
active development partner. 
  




                                                 
1 “Country Level Rapid Impact Assessment of  the Crisis on Employment : A Guide (test 




This report represents the culmination of many peoples’ efforts, and is the first 
rapid impact assessment of the crisis in Africa led by the International Labour 
Organisation. It has drawn heavily from the methodology provided in the test 
version of The Guide to Rapid Impact Assessment of the Crisis on Employment 
(2009).  Professor  James  Heintz  provided  the  insightful  overall  analysis 
contained here. 
 
The  process  was  coordinated  at  ILO  headquarters  by  Alana  Albee,  and  in 
Monrovia by Peter Hall with facilitation by Sina Chuma-Mkandawire and her 
staff in ILO Abuja. Technical fieldwork was tightly sequenced and included 
vital  information  gathering,  analysis  and  reviews  done  by  Erik  von  Uexkull 
(ILO, trade), Yves Perardel (ILO, TRENDs) and Dain Bolwell (ILO, Dialogue). 
Jon Beaulieu (ILO, TRENDs) with Liberian researchers Samuel Thompson and 
Annie Demen led an innovative enquiry process with workers’ and employers’. 
 
Special  thanks  are  given  to  the  Government  of  Liberia,  and  specifically  the 
Ministry of Labour and the full National Tripartite Council. Special recognition 
is given to the Liberia Chamber of Commerce and the Heads of the Liberian 
Labour Congress whose leadership, and networks with the many workers’ and 
employers’  made  the  process  a  success  despite  time  constraints.  In  addition 
special mention is given to the Minister of Finance and his team, the Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Affairs. Contributions by a number of development partners in Monrovia were 
also very helpful, including from the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and UNDP 
.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  5Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  6
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Executive  Summary  and 
Recommendations 
 
The global economic crisis has occurred at a critical junction for Liberia. 
The country has started down the path of development after years of civil war, 
conflict  and  instability  left  the  country’s  3.5  million  people  extremely 
vulnerable  and  the  nation’s  economy  devastated.  The  downturn  adds  to  the 
formidable challenge of reconstruction, peace-building, poverty reduction, and 
expanding the opportunities for decent work. Given the potentially far-reaching 
consequences of the crisis on Liberia’s national development strategy (LPRS) at 
this  time, there  is  an  immediate  need  to  assess the  impact  of  the  crisis  and 
formulate effective responses. 
 
The  ILO,  in  collaboration  with  other  development  partners,  was 
requested by the Government of Liberia to undertake a rapid assessment of the 
global economic crisis and its employment impact. This report documents the 
effects  on  employers  and  workers  and  considers  the  implications  for  the 
realisation of the objectives of the Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (LPRS). 
The  assessment  pulls  together  the  findings  from  worker  and  employer 
interviews;  consultations  with  policymakers,  social  partners,  development 
partners,  and  other  stakeholders;  and  analysis  of  existing  quantitative  data. 
Information was collected over a two month period, primarily during June and 
July, 2009. 
 
 The assessment found that the global economic crisis already has had 
serious implications for the realisation of the goals of the LPRS. The crisis has 
adversely impacted public revenues, which constrain the ability of government 
to  deliver  on  components  of  the  LPRS.  The  growth  path  has  come  under 
pressure due to the collapse of demand in global markets for Liberian products, 
creating  sizeable  challenges  for  restoring  production  and  trade  of  natural 
resource  products.  This  is  affecting  the  on-going  negotiations  of  concession 
agreements.  The  crisis  has  negatively  affected  employment,  with  important 
implications  for poverty  reduction  and  social  stability.  In light  of  the crisis, 
there is a need to revisit and more strictly prioritise areas of delivery within the 
LPRS in order to make the most of limited available resources.  
 
The policy space for launching a comprehensive response to the crisis is 
severely circumscribed in Liberia. Liberia runs a cash-based budget in which 
total  expenditures  must  not  exceed  the  sum  of  current  revenues  and  any 
accumulated  cash  reserves.  Therefore,  there  is  no  scope  for  a  traditional 
expansionary fiscal policy. Instead, any shortfalls in expected revenue collection Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  9
due  to  the  crisis  must  be  met  with  either  cuts  to  spending  or  delays  in 
disbursements. The high degree of dollarisation, the lack of a domestic capital 
market,  and  excess  liquidity  holdings  among  commercial  banks  limit  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The critical importance of public investment 
in  Liberia’s  reconstruction  is  widely  recognised,  both  basic  economic 
infrastructure and critical areas of social infrastructure, such as the construction 
of schools and clinics. With the global crisis, delivery of essential infrastructure 
will continue to depend on donor resources and official development assistance. 
 
The global crisis has impacted the economy through four channels: the 
negative effect on government revenues, the decline in exports and commodity 
prices,  a  less  favourable  climate  for  foreign  investment  and  negotiation  of 
concession agreements, and a reduction in the inflow of remittances. The long-
run effect of the crisis remains uncertain, and depends on the length and depth 
of the global downturn. At this time, donor commitments to Liberia appear to 
have been largely unaffected by the global crisis. Nevertheless, maintaining the 
country’s  credibility  among  the  donor  community  in  order  to  continue  to 
mobilise  external  financing  for  LPRS  delivery  will  depend  on  continued 
progress  towards  the  HIPC  completion  point  over  the  next  year,  requiring 
formal adoption of the Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms.  
 
Impact of the crisis on employment, households, and strategic sectors 
 
The  crisis  is  already  having  a  substantial  effect  on  employment  in 
Liberia. The findings of the assessment suggest that the impact will be felt most 
strongly  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  individuals  self-employed  in 
smallholder  agricultural  production  and  those  working  in  informal 
employment.  In  the  rubber  sector  alone,  the  crisis  will  directly  impact  the 
livelihoods of up to 60,000 smallholder producers and thousands of contract 
workers. Among large enterprises, analysis of government records shows that 
the decline in employment has been particularly noticeable in the rubber and 
iron ore sectors. The consequences for the well-being of the population of this 
loss of employment income will be more far-reaching, since many dependents 
rely on the earnings from each individual in the labour force. 
 
On average, businesses interviewed have reported about a 20 percent 
decrease in turnover from the previous year. For small scale enterprises and 
informal  workers,  many  of  which  operate  in  the  service  sector  catering  to 
domestic markets, the fall in demand will decrease earnings and productivity. 
This decline in the domestic market will directly affect many own-account and 
contributing  family  workers  in  terms  of  their  contributions  to  household 
incomes and family well-being.  
 
Such  pressures  can  further  frustrate  the  already  challenging  goal  to 
improve  educational  attainment  since  they  may  exacerbate  low  school 
attendance, as children and youths are required to assist in the household or 
support income generating activities. At the macro level, reduced government Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  10
revenues  may  have a  knock-on  effect in  terms  of  resources available  to  the 
educational system. 
 
The negative employment effects should be seen within the context of 
Liberia’s vulnerable labour force. Half of the country’s population is under 20 
years of age. If access to decent work opportunities does not improve for young 
people now and in the future, the potential for social and economic instability 
will increase. In addition, most employed Liberians work in vulnerable forms of 
employment with high risks of poverty and no social protections. Informal non-
agricultural employment and employment in agriculture account for 84 percent 
of  total  employment.  Individuals  in  these  types  of  employment  have  low 
earnings  and  face  high  economic  risks.  The  years  of  conflicts  have  had  a 
dramatic impact on the country’s human resources – through lost opportunities 
for  education  and  training.  Two-thirds  of  employed  Liberians,  and  over  80 
percent  of  employed  women,  have  at  most a  primary education.  The  global 
crisis heightens these vulnerabilities and inequities, as the formal labour market 
has  not  been  able  to  generate  sufficient  employment  to  absorb  a  growing 
workforce. 
 
The  assessment  investigated  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  six  strategic 
sectors: rubber, rice, palm oil, iron ore, timber and gold. Rubber is currently 
Liberia’s most important export commodity, accounting for 80 percent of total 
exports  in  2008.  A  significant  decline  in  the  price  of  rubber  has  negatively 
affected workers, employers, and smallholder producers. The crisis comes at a 
crucial time because the government is re-negotiating concession agreements 
with two major plantations. In addition, significant investments in replanting 
have to be made now, including by smallholders, to secure the sector’s future. 
Programmes  to  support  investments  are  critical  for  preventing  the  downturn 
from undermining the economic viability of the sector in the future. Provisions 
in concession agreements which provide support to out-growers for replanting 
should  be  protected.  The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  has  worked  together  with 
donors  to  help  rubber  smallholders  diversify  into  cocoa.  With  financial  and 
technical support, such programmes could be expanded in response to the crisis. 
 
Rice  is  Liberia’s  most  important  food  crop  and  has  tremendous 
importance for food security and political stability. Revitalizing rice production 
among smallholders holds enormous potential for generating employment and 
would reduce pressures on the national budget from government support of rice 
imports. A rough calculation based on prevailing productivity levels suggests 
that if Liberia were to reach self-sufficiency in rice, this would generate the 
equivalent of up to 470,000 additional jobs, although this added employment 
would  be  dominated  by  own-account  and  contributing  family  workers. 
Improving  the  quality  of  employment  in  the  sector  over  time  will  require 
sustained productivity improvements. The global crisis appears to have put an 
end to the rapid increase in rice prices that was reducing living standards, but 
could  dampen  domestic  production  in  a  sector  that  plays  a  central  role  in 
securing jobs, food security and household welfare. The impact of the crisis on 
economic vulnerability underscores the need to revitalise rice production among Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  11
smallholders, an initiative which would require addressing land tenure issues; 
lack of transportation, storage, and milling infrastructure; access to inputs; and 
limited technical know-how. 
 
Palm oil and iron ore are two sectors which have large export potential, 
even though the current level of exports is small. Palm oil has the potential to 
create a  significant  number of  jobs  through  new  concession  agreements  and 
Liberia  is  in  a  strong  competitive  position  to  meet  domestic  and  regional 
demand in West Africa. Production of iron ore has ceased in Liberia, but is 
expected  to  recommence  in  the  near  future  under  two  new  concession 
agreements. Iron mining is capital-intensive and generates fewer jobs than other 
sectors,  but  activities  associated  with  iron  mining  have  already  created 
employment.  A  major  concern  is  that  the  global  crisis  will  cause  delays  in 
foreign investment, production, and anticipated job creation associated with new 
concession  agreements  in  iron  ore  and  palm  oil.  The  crisis  has  already  had 
negative impacts on the iron sector, leading to work force reductions and the 
suspension of road and railway rehabilitation investments.  
 
  Timber exports have not yet recovered and the employment potential of 
the sector has not been realised. The prospects for timber remain uncertain in 
the near future. New concessions have been awarded, but many of these were 
not  viable.  Although  the  problems  of  the  timber  sector  could  have  been 
aggravated by the current crisis, the main problem is a failure to attract foreign 
investors that could revitalise production in the sector.  
 
Gold mining in Liberia remains on a small scale artisanal basis and it is 
unlikely  that  the  sector  will  experience  significant  development  in  the  near 
future. Despite favourable world market conditions, the crisis has affected the 
prospects  for  large-scale  commercial  gold  mining  through  the  tightening  of 
international credit availability for exploration and mineral extraction. 
 
 
Policy responses and strategic areas of intervention 
 
The impact of the crisis on Liberia’s development objectives, as outlined 
in the LPRS, is significant. Given the limited policy space at Liberia’s disposal 
and the on-going reliance on donor support, there is a critical need to prioritise 
movement  towards  the  HIPC  completion  point.  A  prerequisite  for  the 
completion  point  is  the  passage  of  the  public  finance  management  (PFM) 
reforms.  A  well-functioning  PFM  system  is  also  necessary  for  coordinated 
donor support in the future, preferably in the form of increased budget support, 
which  would  improve  the  impact,  the  scale,  and  the  pace  of  development. 
Reaching the completion point would relax Liberia’s fiscal resource constraint 
by providing some additional relief in terms of debt servicing payments and 
opening up the possibility for concessional borrowing. 
 Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  12
In  addressing  the  negative  consequences  of  the  global  crisis, 
infrastructure  investment  through  expanded  public  works  programmes 
represents a strategy with both short-run and long-run benefits. The direct loss 
of  jobs  could  be  addressed  through  emergency  employment  policies  which 
would  provide  employment  opportunities  to  those  adversely  affected  by  the 
crisis, particularly if labour-intensive infrastructure projects are adopted. Such 
programmes  would  leave  behind  public  assets  which  provide  benefits 
communities and the private sector. With sufficient donor and technical support, 
programmes could be scaled up to create jobs for workers displace by the global 
crisis. 
 
However,  short-term  emergency  employment  programmes  do  not 
constitute a comprehensive response to the lack of decent work opportunities in 
Liberia. A national policy framework for creating employment and supporting 
livelihoods is essential if  Liberia is to lay the foundations for equitable and 
inclusive  growth.  Ensuring  that  the  National  Employment  Policy  is  a 
comprehensive and visionary document with broad ownership is necessary at 
this time. The priorities identified in the Employment  Policy should also be 
reflected in the LPRS. Strong institutions are needed to implement a national 
employment  strategy.  The  creation  of  the  National  Bureau  of  Employment 
represents  an  important  step  in  this  direction.  With  appropriate  financial, 
technical,  and  political  support,  the  National  Bureau  of  Employment  can 
coordinate efforts to improve employment opportunities across Ministries and to 
implement  active  labour  market  policies  to  facilitate  equitable  access  to 
employment. 
 
Informal employment is one of the largest categories of employment in 
Liberia. An integrated strategy is needed to improve the earnings, productivity 
and working conditions of those employed in informal activities. This would 
involve the ‘formalisation’ of informal employment, in the sense that strategies 
to support these workers and their livelihood strategies would be developed, 
and, in turn, those in informal employment would be expected to contribute to 
government  tax  revenues  at  an  equitable  rate.    Such  strategies  require  an 
integrated approach involving training, finance, technical support to enterprises, 
targeted public investments, improved labour force information, and regulatory 
changes to support the growth of SMEs. Coordination across various Ministries 
(e.g. Commerce, Labour, Finance, Agriculture, Gender, Youth, and Planning) 
would be needed to create an integrated for improving the quality of informal 
employment. 
 
The period covered by the concession agreements exceeds the expected 
duration of the global crisis. Any deterioration in Liberia’s bargaining position 
is likely to be temporary. Therefore, it is important to ensure that short-term 
responses to the crisis do not have long-run negative consequences for Liberia’s 
development trajectory. The planned National Investment Law will be useful to 
give the government a stronger stance against pressure for ad hoc benefits to 
companies. If unavoidable, explicitly linking temporary benefits (e.g. reduced 
royalty  payments)  to  global  commodity  prices  represents  one  strategy  for Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  13
making sure that the any crisis-related benefits are temporary. Leniency can be 
granted  to  concession  holders  while  global  markets  are  depressed,  but  then 
removed once they have recovered. During boom periods, government’s share 
of the natural resource rents would rise. 
 
The potential for increased industrial disputes and conflicts linked, at 
least in part, to the crisis is significant. Such conflicts can be costly in economic, 
social, and human terms, and processes of social dialogue can reduce these 
costs.  In anticipation  of  these  growing  tensions,  government, along  with the 
social partners, should be prepared to set up, as well as to strengthen existing, 
social dialogue bodies where they are needed and to make effective mediation 
services available. 
 
Given domestic resource constraints, it is important to identify resources 
which are under-utilised. Liberia’s relatively healthy financial sector represents 
one potential source of such resources. The domestic banking sector has the 
capacity  to  extend  additional  credit  which  could  support  productive 
investments.  Already,  several  domestic  banks  have  created  microfinance 
programmes.  These  could  be  expanded  within  a  coherent  framework  for 
financial  sector  reform,  with  government  support.  Informal  and  small-scale 
enterprises face multiple constraints, and providing credit without addressing 
these other needs will have a limited impact. There is a need for a coordinated 
approach  which  pulls  together  small  loans,  capacity  building,  and  market 
facilitation. Not all enterprises will be prepared to take advantage of micro- and 
small-scale  loan  programmes.  However,  for  those  who  are  ready,  such 
initiatives could help address the negative impacts of the crisis on small-scale 
enterprises,  the  vulnerable  self-employed,  and  smallholder  agricultural 
producers. 
 
Although Liberia may appear to have little policy space to respond to the 
challenges raised by the global crisis, there are a number of strategies which 
could be pursued, and these should be considered for prioritisation within the 
LPRS framework. They should build on recent initiatives and points of strength, 
and should focus policy efforts on improving employment opportunities as the 
single  best  strategy  for  reducing  poverty,  raising  living  standards,  and 
maintaining social stability. The Poverty Reduction Strategy and the National 
Employment Policy provide two complementary blueprints for moving forward. 
The challenge of inclusive growth and equitable development is very much a 
challenge of creating decent work for all. It will take years to get there, but 
developing  an  appropriate  employment-centred  response  to  the current  crisis 
represents a concrete step towards this ultimate goal. 
 
 
Priority Strategic Actions and Recommendations 
 
 In the course of the rapid assessment of the global crisis, a number of 
concrete  responses  emerged,  many  building  on  programmes,  processes,  and Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  14
policies already underway. These represent priority strategic actions to be taken 




·  Public  Revenue:  Given  the  uncertainty  surrounding  government 
revenues,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  has  adopted  a  risk  management 
strategy  for  fiscal  year  2009/10  in  which  cash  disbursements  to  line 
ministries  are  subject  to  review,  depending  on  the  evolving  revenue 
situation. Any efforts to re-prioritize spending over the next year should 
ideally take into account the critical areas of LPRS delivery that will be 
adversely affected by the crisis as detailed in this report, with particular 
attention to public investments in infrastructure and education.  
 
·  HIPC: Rapid progress towards the HIPC completion point is already a 
government priority. The global crisis only increases the importance of 
this objective. Substantial progress has already been made and the new 
PMF legislation is expected to be adopted later in 2009. Nevertheless, it 
is  important  to  maintain  clear  benchmarks  for  pushing  forward  on 
adopting,  and  implementing,  this  crucial  piece  of  legislation.  
 
·  National Employment Policy: Many of the specific details of the policy 
areas raised in the report have been, and could be further, incorporated 
into the draft National Employment Policy (NEP). Given the centrality 
of  employment  in  Liberia’s  development  strategy,  it  is  important  to 
move forward in finalizing and adopting the NEP. In so doing, the draft 
NEP should be reviewed in light of the findings of this assessment. 
 
·  Emergency  Employment:  Numerous  emergency  employment 
programmes are currently operating, or have been administered in the 
past. In the context of building a National Bureau of Employment, an 
audit  needs  to  be  performed  immediately  on  (1)  the  current  state  of 
emergency employment programmes and (2) the new needs due to the 
crisis. Given this information, a coordinated and coherent approach to 
these programmes can be developed, with technical assistance provided 
as  needed.  In  this  process,  priority  should  be  given  to  infrastructure 
investments, extending the focus beyond road building, to include the 
need to rebuild social services (e.g. school construction). 
 
·  Labour Force Survey (LFS): This should remain a top priority. The 
lack of detailed labour force information that adequately captures the 
entire  population  heightens  the  difficulties  in  developing  meaningful 
employment policies. The information provided by the LFS would help 
accelerate  the  development  of  a  strategy  for  informal  employment.     
                                                 
2    For the ILO, these recommendations should inform the Decent Work country programming. 
The findings of this assessment also suggest that it is important for the ILO to move beyond a 
small project-based approach, and extend its programming effort to include technical assistance 
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The  LFS  has  the  potential  to  generate  an  unprecedented  set  of  high 
quality information for Liberia, and therefore it is essential to ensure that 
adequate oversight is provided throughout the survey and data collection 
process. 
 
·  Rice production: The Ministry of Agriculture has suggested that a small 
number of pilot projects could be launched which revitalize smallholder 
rice production in targeted communities through an integrated approach. 
These  programmes  would  provide  core  infrastructure  (roads,  milling 
facilities,  storage);  resolution  of  land  tenure  issues;  and  technical 
assistance (e.g. extension services). Such pilot programmes could then 
be fine-tuned and scaled up for a broader impact. 
 
·  Financial sector: The challenge for the financial sector in Liberia is one 
of  creating  the  right  set  of  institutions  to  more  fully  mobilize  the 
resources which are already available. As a concrete first step, a task 
force on mobilizing development finance in Liberia could be convened: 
including  the  Ministry  of  Commerce,  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the 
Ministry of  Labour, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Bank of 
Liberia,  the  National  Investment  Commission,  and  the  managing 
directors of the commercial banks. The task force would be assigned to 
identify concrete initiatives and reforms that remove the constraints to 
extending credit for productive investment and to support SMEs. 
 
·  Concession  Agreements:  In  ongoing  and  future  concession 
negotiations, it is crucial to ensure that short-term concerns with regard 
to the crisis do not have long-run negative consequences in terms of 
unfavourable  agreements  that  could  affect  Liberia’s  development 
trajectory for decades to come. While negotiations should move ahead 
quickly  where  possible,  the  government  should  resist  pressure  for 
unjustified  ad  hoc  crisis  related  benefits  and  maintain  a  long  term 
perspective in the negotiations. 
 
·  Tree crop investment: The need for support to tree crop investment has 
two  components:  providing resources  for  replanting  of existing  crops 
and  diversification  (e.g.  the  expansion  of  cocoa).  Programmes  and 
policies exist already to support re-planting and diversification. These 
need to be protected and scaled up in response to the crisis. Provisions in 
concession  agreements  that  provide  assistance  for  smallholder 
investments need to be maintained. 
 
·  Donor support: Given limits to the domestic resources available, many 
of these recommendations depend on an effective strategy for sustaining 
and mobilizing donor aid. The government has successfully managed to 
maintain  donor  support  in  light  of  the  crisis.  Such  efforts  must  be 
sustained and the government should be poised to take advantage of new 
opportunities when they arise. Ideally, donors should be persuaded to Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  16
provide an increasing amount of direct budget support to build capacity 
within Liberia and to ensure that the advancements made are sustainable.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The  global  economic  crisis  has  made  Liberia’s  formidable  task  of 
reconstruction,  peace-building,  and  development  more  challenging  and  has 
compromised  the  goal  of  expanding  decent  employment  opportunities  and 
reducing poverty for the country’s 3.5 million people. Employment is central to 
the  process  of  post-conflict  recovery,  for  addressing  poverty,  creating  a 
foundation for equitable growth, and re-integrating Liberia’s population into the 
productive life of the nation. For this reason, assessing the impact of the global 
crisis  on  employment  and  livelihoods  in  Liberia  is  essential  in  order  to 
understand the effect on the country’s reconstruction efforts and development 
strategies, as reflected in the Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (LPRS), Lift 
Liberia, adopted in 2008. 
 
The  ILO,  in  collaboration  with  other  development  partners  has  been 
requested by the Government of Liberia to undertake a rapid assessment of the 
global  economic  crisis  and  its  impact  on  employment  in  Liberia.
3  The 
assessment  documents  the  effects  on  employers  and  workers  and  considers 
these impacts in terms of their implications for the realisation of the objectives 
of the poverty reduction strategy and within the overall economic context. This 
report  is  a  compilation  of  the  major  findings  of  the  components  of  the 
assessment related to growth, trade, the macroeconomy, investment, strategic 
sectors, and employment. In addition, the report analyses the scope for policy 
interventions and suggests a number of strategic responses. 
 
The assessment found that the global economic crisis already has had 
serious impacts on employment, government resources, foreign investment, and 
the  overall  development  trajectory.  The  crisis  has  adversely  impacted  public 
revenues, which constrain the ability of government to deliver on components 
of the LPRS. The expected growth path has come under pressure due to the 
collapse  of  global  demand,  creating  sizeable  barriers  to  revitalizing  the 
economy, including increasing exports of natural resource based products. This 
is  affecting  the  on-going  negotiations  and  implementation  of  concession 
agreements. The crisis is having a substantial negative effect on employment 
and  the  impact  will  be  felt  most  strongly  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
individuals  self-employed  in  smallholder  agriculture  and  those  working  in 
informal employment. 
 
                                                 
3    This overall assessment was intended as a background document prepared for key 
stakeholders as part of the national Symposium on the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
the Liberian Economy held in Monrovia in August 2009. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  19
The crisis has not only affected existing employment and production, but 
has  altered  expectations  of  future  job  creation,  economic  growth,  and 
possibilities for development. Given these changes, there is a need to revisit and 
more  strictly  prioritise  areas  of  delivery  within  the  LPRS.  In  addition  to 
documenting the impact of the global crisis on Liberia, this report also presents 
a  number  of  recommendations  for  policy  responses,  based  on  the  detailed 
findings and analysis of the rapid impact assessment. 
 
 
Structure of the report 
 
  The next sections of the report provide a brief overview of the economic 
and employment situation in Liberia prior to the crisis. This general background 
information  is  important  for  providing  a  context  for  the  rapid  impact 
assessment. In addition, the content of the Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and the draft National Employment Policy are summarised, since these policy 
documents provide a framework for a number of the issues which are addressed 
in the analysis. 
 
  The  report  then  turns  to  the  impact  of  the  crisis,  beginning  with  an 
examination of the various channels through which the global crisis is affecting 
the  Liberia  economy.  The  crisis  is  often  identified  as  a  ‘financial  crisis.’ 
However, in the case of Liberia, the financial sector is not the primary channel 
of transmission. Instead, the effects on government revenues, trade, commodity 
prices,  foreign  investment,  and  remittances  are  much  more  important.  The 
report then documents the impact on employment specifically. There is clear 
evidence that  the  crisis  has  negatively  affected  employment opportunities  in 
Liberia. These effects are detailed for a number of strategic sectors: rubber, rice, 
palm oil, iron ore, timber, and gold. 
 
  In the final sections of the report, possible policy responses are explored. 
The space for using traditional macroeconomic policies to counter the crisis is 
extremely circumscribed in Liberia. Nevertheless, some possibilities exist for 
making  the  most  of  what  resources  are  available  –  e.g.  working  with  the 
banking sector to mobilise additional credit. The report also examines labour 
market institutions, emergency  employment policies, and the need for social 
dialogue in the context of the crisis. The report concludes with a summary of the 
suggestions  from  the  rapid  assessment  in  terms  of  short-term  responses  and 
longer-term strategic priorities.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  20
 
2.  Methodology 
The  ILO  has  developed  a  guide  for  Country  Level  Rapid  Impact 
Assessment of the Crisis on Employment
4 that provides a guiding framework for 
analyzing the impacts of economic crises. The framework considers the effects 
of the crisis at the macro level, in key sectors, on employment and the labour 
market, and, perhaps most importantly, on households and the well-being of the 
population. This framework was adapted and used for the rapid assessment in 
Liberia. 
 
If the rapid assessment is to uncover timely information, it cannot wait 
for official statistics and secondary data to become available. This challenge is 
more profound in a country like Liberia, with extremely limited employment 
and labour force information. Therefore, the rapid assessment relied on worker 
and employer interviews; consultations with policymakers, key informants, and 
other  stakeholders;  and  descriptive  analysis  of  existing  quantitative  data. 
Because  of  the  lack  of  detailed  economic  and  labour  force  information, 
economic modeling exercises were not used. Information on the impact of the 
crisis  was  collected  through  a  series  of  missions  to  Liberia  over  roughly  2 
months (with much of the research concentrated in June and July, 2009). The 
assessment  team  gathered  information  in  stages,  with  a  subset  of  the  team 
working  in-country  at  any  one  time  throughout  this  period.  Two  national 
consultants also assisted with the assessment. 
 
Worker and employer interviews and focus group discussions 
 
Prior to undertaking interviews, the ILO sought collaboration with the 
National  Tripartite  Council  (NTC)  to  identify  a  list  of  key  enterprises  to 
interview.  The  NTC  originally  proposed  two  to  three  companies  in  eleven 
sectors  (rubber,  oil  palm,  timber,  roads,  mining,  energy,  petroleum, 
communications, finance, business and rice). However, due to time constraints 
of  conducting  the  interviews  within  a  three  week  period  and  other  issues, 
interviews were held with roughly two employers in each of the nine sectors, 
leaving out petroleum and communications. Focus group discussions were also 





A select group of companies in a variety of sectors were chosen through 
a consultative process with the Liberian National Tripartite Commission. The 
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discussions  with  private  sector  companies  focused  on  the  impact  of  the 
economic crisis on the companies and their sector, their reaction and mitigation 
strategies (with a focus on employment) and their expectations for the future. 
One-on-one discussions with plant managers, human resources managers and/or 
other responsible and knowledgeable persons focused on these issues. The idea 
was to hear the ‘story’ of the crisis as they perceived it and how it is impacting 
on their operations. In addition, we asked companies to prepare, in advance of 
our visit, relevant data and information.  
 
Overall  19  key  informant  discussions  were  held,  often  with  multiple 
informants,  representing  major  enterprises  operating  in  Liberia.  A  few 
companies were not cooperative when asked for meetings and limited support 
was provided by employers’ associations to gain access. The questionnaire is 
included in the appendix – the major issues discussed are as follows: 
 
·  Company information: name, location, domestic and international sales, 
employment structure, and contact details for follow-up questions. 
·  Impact of crisis: magnitude of the impact of the crisis, channels through 
which the crisis affects the company (overseas demand, prices, inflow of 
investment, access to finance, etc.), situation of the company compared 
to  competitors  and  within  its  parent  company  if  applicable,  specific 
factors that make the impact of the crisis more or less severe in Liberia, 
and expectations of the situation in the coming months. 
·  Trends  in  key  variables:  changes  in  sales  and  orders,  employment, 
selling price, investment, expenditure on training, profit, exports, and 
capacity utilisation. 
·  Mitigation strategies: Measures that the company has already adopted or 
is planning to deal with the crisis, including cost-cutting, postponing of 
investment,  lay-offs  and  hiring  freezes,  etc.  Assistance 





Meetings with more than 110 employed and unemployed workers in a 
variety of sectors were held separately from employers and facilitated in most 
instances by the trade unions. Ideally, an attempt was made to interview the 
workers of companies where management was also interviewed. However, due 
to a variety of circumstances this was not possible in all instances. Discussions 
were held through focus groups and by key informants. Individual interviews 
were  done  in  select  cases  to  deepen  the  understanding  of  the  impact  at  the 
household  or  worker  level.  The  meetings  examined  how  the  crisis  was 
impacting workers, their work and their households, and the coping mechanisms 
adopted. Guiding questions for focus group discussions are in the appendix. 
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Consultations with Policymakers, Key Informants, and Other Stakeholders 
 
Meetings were also held with relevant government bodies including the 
Ministries of Labour, Commerce, Agriculture, Finance, and Land, Mines and 
Energy  (MLME),  the  National  Investment  Commission,  the  Bureau  of 
Concessions, the Central Bank, and the Forestry Development Authority. A list 
of organisations, ministries, and agencies that were interviewed is included in 
the appendix. 
 
Analysis of existing quantitative data 
 
When  possible,  quantitative  data  was  used  to  document  general 
economic trends, the structure of employment, and changes in the economic 
situation during the crisis period. Such data is limited in Liberia, prohibiting 
more  complex  analysis.  Therefore,  when  quantitative  data  is  used  in  the 
assessment,  we  restrict  ourselves  to  a  simple  descriptive  presentation  of  the 
information. Survey information on current employment trends is not available. 
Therefore, the assessment focused on the impact of the crisis on employment in 
larger enterprises based on a detailed review of recent government records in 
which information on employment is available. We discuss the findings of the 
analysis of government records later in the report. 
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3.  A brief overview of Liberia’s 
economy before the crisis 
  When the  global economic crisis first unfolded in the second half of 
2008,  Liberia  was  in  the  process  of  recovering  from  decades  of  political 
instability and civil war – conflicts which destroyed infrastructure, lead to the 
widespread collapse of social institutions, and had a devastating impact on the 
country’s economy. The conflicts also had a dramatic impact on the country’s 
human resources – through lost opportunities for education and training among 
a sizeable portion of the population. Many of the causes of these past conflicts 
remain unresolved: disputes over land distribution and tenure, food security – 
particularly in terms of the availability and affordability of rice, and control over 
the country’s natural resource wealth. The conflict ended in 2003 and, in 2006, 
a  new  government  was  democratically  elected.  The  task  of  post-conflict 
reconstruction remains formidable and the global crisis adds to this challenge. 
 
  The  economic  impact  of  the  years  of  conflict  is  evident.  Table  1 
summarises average growth rates from 1970 to the present. The period 1980-
2003 includes the years of political instability (beginning with the coup in 1980) 
and civil war (ending in 2003). During this period, the Liberian economy shrank 
dramatically – often characterised as the most dramatic economic collapse of 
any country in the post World War II period. Since the end of the conflict, GDP 
growth rates have picked up significantly – reaching 7 to 9 percent following 
the  2006  elections.  However,  growth  is  expected  to  slow  down  to  under  5 











2008 7.1%  




                                                 
5    IMF (2009). Liberia: Second Review under the Three-year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
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  The  economic  collapse  is  particularly  pronounced  in  the  trends  in 
average per capita GDP (Figure 1). At the end of the conflict, in 2003, real per 
capita GDP was about a fifth of its average level in the 1970s. Per capita income 
began to recover in 1997, with the adoption of the Abuja Accord. However, the 
resumption of fighting in 1999 created a further setback to the economy. Since 
2003, per capita income has stabilised, but it remains far below the historic high 
levels of the 1970s. 
 



































  Table 2 below shows the distribution of projected GDP by economic 
sector in 2008. Agricultural activities currently account for the largest share of 
Liberia’s GDP – about 42 percent. Production of rice, rubber, and cassava are 
the  most  significant  activities  within  agriculture.  Outside  of  agriculture,  the 
service sector contributes the most to economic production as captured by the 
national accounts. Manufacturing is relatively small, accounting for about 12 
percent of GDP. Mining production is quite limited, although new investment in 
existing iron mines will alter this situation in the future.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  26
 
Table 2. Projected GDP by Sector of Activity, 2008. 
$1992 US 
(millions) Percent




Services $130.7 25.8%  
 
Source: Central Bank of Liberia Annual Report, 2008. 
Note: Charcoal accounts for 81% of total forestry output in the above figures. 
 
  Exports of natural resource based products have been the cornerstone of 
the Liberian economy. Figure 2 below shows historic trends in exports, imports, 
and the trade balance from the 1970s to the present. Reliable data for much of 
the civil war period is not available. In the 1970s, Liberia had strong export 
performance. Imports were roughly in line with exports and the country often 
had a positive trade balance. The civil war led to the collapse of the main export 
sectors. Since the end of the conflict, the export sector showed clear indications 
of recovery. However, imports have also risen and the trade balance has been 
negative.  The  growth  of  imports  has  outstripped  the  growth  of  exports, 
particularly in recent years with the rapid increase in food and energy prices. 
 



























exports imports trade balance
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 and IMF (2009). Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  27
 
 
  Figure 3 shows the current composition of exports, based on 2008 mirror 
data (that is, imports of goods and services from Liberia as reported by trading 
partners)  from  the  the  UN’s  Comtrade  database.  The  single  most  important 
commodity is rubber, accounting for 78 percent of the total value of exports. 
Other exports – of gold, diamonds, cocoa, and iron ore – account for a much 
less significant portion of the total value of exports. Statistics on current exports 
in  Liberia  do  not  capture  the  export  potential  of  the  country  in  other 
commodities, such as palm oil and timber. Exports of iron ore, for example, are 
not related to current production, but rather to existing inventories. We return to 
these issues in the sectoral analysis later in the report. 
 
 
















Source: UN Comtrade database. 
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  Figure 4 presents the composition of imports into Liberia, again based 
on 2008 data from the Ministry of Commerce as reported by the Central Bank 
of Liberia. Liberia currently depends on imports for energy and capital goods. 
Rice  and  other  foodstuffs  account  for  about  a  quarter  of  the  value  of  total 
imports. This represents an increase in the quantity of imported food, but also 
the effect of higher global rice prices in 2008. The growth in rice imports raises 
important  concerns.  On  the  one  hand,  rice  is  the  staple  commodity  and 
consumers depend on imported rice to supplement domestic production. On the 









Rice Other food & animals Machinery & equip. Petroleum products Other imports
 
Source: Central Bank of Liberia Annual Report, 2008. 
 
 
In recent years, gross investment (i.e. gross fixed capital formation) has 
also recovered. As Figure 5 below indicates, gross investment increased from an 
estimated  5  percent  of  GDP  in  2001  to  over  16  percent  of  GDP  in  2005. 
Continued improvements in productive investments are an essential component Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  29
of overall reconstruction and recovery in the country. As we will discuss later, 
the global economic crisis will likely slow this trend of growing investment, 
particularly for certain critical sectors. 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2008. 
 
 
  Liberia currently has an unsustainable external debt burden – at the time 
of the 2006 elections it was the highest in Africa relative to the size of the 
economy. According to the Central Bank of Liberia Annual Report 2008, the 
stock of external debt stood at approximately  US$ 3.4 billion in October of 
2008.  Liberia  has  received  significant  debt  relief  over  the  past  few  years, 
including a significant buy-back of debt at discounted values in April of 2009. 
Nevertheless,  the  debt  burden  remains  unsustainable.  Many  debt  servicing 
payments have been suspended, substantially easing the impact of the external 
debt  in  the  short-run.  Liberia  has  reached  the  HIPC  decision  point  and  is 
currently moving towards its completion point, at which time further debt relief 
would be forthcoming. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  30
 
 
4.  The  employment  and  labour 
market  situation  in  Liberia  before 
the crisis 
  Liberia’s population of about 3.5 million is young.
6 As Table 3 shows, 
over half of the population is under 20 years of age and 30 percent is under 10 
years. This age distribution has several important implications. First, the number 
of dependents in an average Liberian household is likely to be high. Income 
from a single job will have to support many individuals, many of them children. 
This  increases  the  poverty  risk  of  households  –  particularly  when  access  to 
employment  becomes  less  stable  –  and  therefore  makes  the  importance  of 
creating decent employment opportunities more acute. Second, a large number 
of  youths  will  have  to  be  integrated  into  the  labour  market  over  time.  If 
employment  opportunities  are  not  available  or  if  young  people  do  not  have 
access to the opportunities that exist due to lack of skills, social and economic 
instability will likely increase. In the case of Liberia, this challenge is made 
more  difficult  by  the  additional  need  to  re-integrate  into  the  labour  market 
persons adversely affected by the civil war. Third, investments in education and 
skills  building  are  critical  for  labour  market  inclusion  and  the  long-run 
productivity  of the  Liberian  economy.  A  shortfall  in  building  human  capital 
among today’s youth will have negative consequences for the future. 
 
 
Table 3. Age distribution of the population, 2008. 
Age  Male  Female  Total 
0-9  30%  30%  30% 
10-19  23%  23%  23% 
20-29  17%  19%  18% 
30-39  12%  12%  12% 
40-49  8%  7%  8% 
50-59  4%  4%  4% 
60-69  3%  3%  3% 
70-79  1%  1%  1% 
80+  1%  1%  1% 
TOTAL  100%  100%  100% 
Source: 2008 National Population and Housing Census (NPCH) 
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  Although  a  national  labour  force  survey  is  planned  for  Liberia, 
comprehensive labour force statistics are not currently available. In the absence 
of  up  to  date  and  timely  labour  market  data,  the  most  recent  information 
available comes from the 2007 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) 
survey.  This survey provides a snapshot of the labour force, but it is important 
to recognise that these data were collected through an old sample frame dating 
from 1984 and may not represent the precise structure of the labour market.
7 We 
use the estimates from the CWIQ survey in this overview of the Liberian labour 
market. 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of total employment and the employment-to-
population ratio by age group. The employment-to-population ratio provides a 
sense of how many individuals, within a particular age group, are employed. 
The internationally accepted definition of employment
8  includes anyone who 
was  engaged  in  an  economically  productive  activity.
9  The  estimates  are 
restricted to the working age population (15 years of age or older). 
 
 
Table 4. Employment and employment population ratios, 2007. 
Age M W Total M W Total
15-19 80,000 78,000 158,000 52% 52% 52%
20-24 68,000 77,000 144,000 60% 60% 60%
25-29 64,000 75,000 139,000 74% 64% 68%
30-34 56,000 67,000 123,000 80% 74% 77%
35-39 68,000 75,000 142,000 85% 77% 80%
40-44 55,000 52,000 107,000 86% 78% 82%
45-49 56,000 46,000 103,000 84% 81% 84%
50-54 37,000 22,000 59,000 80% 73% 77%
55-59 25,000 15,000 40,000 86% 75% 82%
60-64 15,000 8,000 24,000 68% 44% 60%
65-69 9,000 5,000 14,000 69% 38% 54%
70+ 12,000 7,000 19,000 41% 37% 40%
TOTAL  545,000 526,000 1,072,000 71% 65% 68%
employment (number) employment/population
 
Source: CWIQ survey. 
Totals may differ slightly from sum of components due to rounding. 
                                                 
7    Some analysts have raised concerns that the Liberia CWIQ survey may not be truly 
representative of the population.  
8 Employment is defined in the resolution adopted by the 13th International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians (ICLS) as persons above a specified age who performed any work at all, in 
the reference period, for pay or profit (or pay in kind), or were temporarily absent from a job for 
such reasons as illness, maternity or parental leave, holiday, training or industrial dispute. The 
resolution also states that unpaid family workers who work for at least one hour should be 
included in the count of employment, although many countries use a higher hour limit in their 
definition. 
9    By ‘economically productive’ we mean any activity whose output would be recognized and 
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In  general,  the  employment-to-population  ratio  rises  with  age  until 
individuals  reach  their  60s,  at  which  point  it  drops  off  significantly. 
Employment-to-population ratios are similar for women and men under the age 
of 25. After 25 years of age, women’s employment as a share of the population 
grows more slowly than men’s. This is explained by a slightly lower labour 
force participation rate among these women, most likely due to unpaid childcare 
responsibilities  in  the  home.  Across  the  entire  population,  employment-to-
population  ratios  of  over  80  percent  are  not  uncommon  during  the  prime 
working  age  years,  underscoring  the  critical  importance  of  employment  in 
Liberia for both men and women. These ratios are quite high by international 
standards. In the absence of a social safety net, Liberians have to work if they, 
and their families, are to survive, even if working conditions are poor and the 
earnings from employment extremely low.  
 
  Although rates of employment and labour force participation are high in 
Liberia,  not  all  employment  is  the  same.  The  share  of  the  working  poor  is 
extremely high with more than 85 per cent not earning a sufficient income to lift 
themselves  and  their  families  above  the  US$1  a  day  poverty  line.  Most 
employed  Liberians  work  in  small  scale  agriculture  and  in  informal,  non-
agricultural activities. These activities tend to be highly precarious with low 
productivity and low earnings. Table 5 shows the distribution of employment by 
type of  employer.  Informal non-agricultural employment and employment in 
agriculture  each  account  for  about  42  percent  of  total  employment  –  or  84 
percent of all employment in the country. Public sector employment comprises 
just over 6 percent of the total and employment in NGOs approximately another 
3 percent. According to the CWIQ estimates, formal employment in the private 
sector amounts to just 5.6 percent of total employment. 
 
Table  5.  Employment  (15+)  by  sex  and  type  of  employer  (including  self-
employed), 2007. 
Civil service 42,000 7.7% 11,000 2.1% 53,000 5.0%
Other public 6,000 1.1% 2,000 0.4% 9,000 0.8%
Public corporation 5,000 0.9% 2,000 0.4% 6,000 0.6%
NGO 20,000 3.7% 10,000 1.9% 29,000 2.7%
Cooperative 4,000 0.7% 2,000 0.4% 5,000 0.5%
International organization 6,000 1.1% 2,000 0.4% 7,000 0.7%
Formal, non-agric. 37,000 6.8% 23,000 4.4% 60,000 5.6%
Informal, non-agric. 203,000 37.3% 251,000 47.6% 454,000 42.5%
Agriculture 221,000 40.6% 224,000 42.5% 445,000 41.7%
Total M F
 Source: CWIQ survey. 
 
 
  Liberia’s primary challenge is not necessarily unemployment, but a lack 
of  decent  work  as  most  employed  individuals  are  not  earning  a  sufficient 
income to lift themselves and their families out of poverty. It is important to 
note that unemployment rate is not a very useful indicator in economies with Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  33
high  poverty  rates  and  few  social  protections.  Nevertheless,  there  is  some 
controversy  around  the  unemployment  rate  in  Liberia.  The  international 
definition of unemployment requires an unemployed individual to be a) without 
work, b) available for work and c) actively looking for work. Individuals are 
considered employed if they work for pay, for profit, or contribute to family 
income  for  at  least one hour during  a  specific reference period
10.  Using  the 
official definition, the measured unemployment rate in Liberia is 5.5 percent. 
According  to  Table  5,  only  about  16  percent  of  all  employment  can  be 
considered  to  be  formal  paid  employment,  or  about  15  percent  of  the 
economically active population. Since only 15 percent of the labour force is 
employed  in  paid  employment,  some  argue  that  the  unemployment  rate  in 
Liberia is around 85 percent. However, the vast majority of this 85 percent is 
actually  employed,  but  working  as  own  account  workers  and  contributing 
family workers – vulnerable employment which is typically characterised by 
low productivity and very low earnings.
11  
 
  Table 6 looks at the distribution of employment from another angle – the 
sector of activity. Unfortunately, a large share of employment is not classified 
by sector in the CWIQ data (listed as ‘other’ in Table 6). Nevertheless, the 
information which does exist provides some further insight into the nature of 
employment in Liberia. Not surprisingly, agriculture clearly dominates. Outside 
of  agriculture,  services  are  important,  including  retail  and  wholesale  trade. 
Industry provides very few jobs. 
 
Table 6. Employed persons (15+), by sex and sector of main activity, 2007 
Sector No. % No. % No. %
Crop farming 249,00 45.9 255,000 48.5 504,000 47.2
Livestock/poultry 1,000 0.1 - 0 1,000 0.1
Forestry/logging 2,000 0.3 1,000 0.1 2,000 0.2
Fishing 2,000 0.4 1,000 0.2 3,000 0.3
Mining/quarrying 5,000 1 - 0.1 6,000 0.5
Manufacturing 2,000 0.3 2,000 0.3 4,000 0.3
Utilities 3,000 0.5 1,000 0.2 4,000 0.4
Construction 13,000 2.3 - 0 13,000 1.2
Wholesale/retail trade 25,000 4.6 48,000 9.2 73,000 6.9
Transport, storage, comm. 8,000 1.5 1,000 0.3 9,000 0.9
Banking/financial services 3,000 0.5 1,000 0.2 4,000 0.4
Community services 57,000 10.4 17,000 3.2 73,000 6.9
Other 174000 32.1 198000 37.7 372000 34.9
Total 543,000 100 525,000 100 1,067,000 100
Men Women Total
 Source: CWIQ survey. 
                                                 
10 See footnote 6 for full definition of employment.  
11 Vulnerable employment is sometimes calculated as the number of own-account and 
contributing family workers expressed as a proportion of total employment. These two 
categories are considered particularly vulnerable in terms of high levels of economic risk and 
the weakness of institutional arrangements governing the employment relationship, two 
indicators of decent work deficits.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  34
 
  Most employed Liberians have limited educations. Figure 6 shows the 
distribution  of  employment  by  educational attainment.  Nearly  two-thirds  (66 
percent) of employed Liberians have a primary school education or less. There 
are  clear  gender  inequalities  apparent  with  regard  to  educational  attainment. 
Over 80 percent of employed women have at most a primary education. Across 
the employed population, about 30 percent have some secondary education – for 
women,  the  fraction  is  about  18  percent.  This  low  level  of  educational 
attainment among the working population reduces productivity and the earnings 
potential of the population. 
 




















  In summary, most employed individuals work long hours in low-paying, 
precarious and low-productivity activities. Only a minority have access to what 
could be considered formal wage employment. Own account workers, unpaid 
family workers, and those employed as contract workers are often not covered 
by  basic  social  protections  or  labour  laws.  The  lack  of  decent  employment 
opportunities is compounded by the large number of dependents that rely on 
each employed person – raising the risk of poverty in the absence of any social 
safety net.  In general, the majority of the workforce is poorly educated with 
low skills, which limits labour productivity and the ability to take advantage of 
better opportunities when they become available. When examining the impact 
of the economic crisis on Liberia, the reality of this structure of employment 
must be kept in mind. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  35Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  36
 
 
5.  The  Liberia  Poverty  Reduction 
Strategy and National Employment 
Policy 
 
Lift Liberia: The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
 
  In  2008,  Liberia  released  its  poverty  reduction  strategy  (LPRS),  Lift 
Liberia, which describes the government’s primary strategies for growth and 
human development over the period 2008-2011. The LPRS is structured along 
four pillars: 
 
·  Peace and security 
·  Economic revitalisation 
·  Governance and the rule of law 
·  Infrastructure and basic services 
 
Each  of  the  pillars  is  composed  of  concrete  policy  goals  and  specific 
programmatic  objectives.  Through  this  policy  framework  the  LPRS  aims  to 
create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth. The growth strategy 
outlined  in  the  LPRS  has  three  central  components:  (1)  rebuilding  basic 
infrastructure,  (2)  restore  production  in  natural  resource  products  such  as 
rubber, timber, mining, and cash crops, and (3) encourage diversification of the 
economy over the long-term. 
 
As the analysis in this report will detail in much greater depth, the global 
economic crisis has important implications for the realisation of the objectives 
of the LPRS. The crisis has adversely impacted public revenues, which will 
constrain  the  ability  of  government  to  deliver  on  components  of  the  LPRS, 
particularly those which rely on public resources. The growth strategy has come 
under pressure due to the collapse of demand in key global markets, creating 
sizeable challenges for restoring production in natural resource products. As this 
report  will  discuss  at  some  length,  the  global  recession  has  had  a  negative 
impact  on  employment  in  certain  sectors,  with  important  implications  for 
poverty reduction and social stability. It is difficult to assess the degree to which 
the global crisis will ultimately affect the realisation of the LPRS at this point in 
time. Nevertheless, it is clear that the global crisis intensifies the challenges 
which  Liberia  faces  in  terms  of  realizing  its  strategic  plan  for  national 
development. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  37
 
Improving employment opportunities is central to the objectives of the 
LPRS.  Employment  is  the  primary  channel  through  which  the  benefits  of 
revitalised growth will be widely shared. Therefore, it is an essential component 
of  inclusive  growth  and  poverty  reduction.  Creating  opportunities  for  all 
individuals to participate in the economic life of the country through decent 
employment is also essential for sustainable peace and social stability. Good 
governance  and  economic  infrastructure  are  essential  for  generating 
employment and improving the quality of existing opportunities. Basic services, 
such as health and education, represent important investments in the country’s 
human  resources,  investments  that  provide  a  foundation  for  future  growth. 
Access to employment also builds skills and capacity, through labour market 
experience and on-the-job education. 
 
The LPRS includes specific policy recommendations and targets with 
regard to employment and labour market policies within the pillar ‘economic 
revitalisation.’  In  many  respects,  employment  is  a  cross-cutting  issue  and 
policies to support employment are incorporated into strategies for agriculture, 
mining,  infrastructure,  and  investment  promotion.  However,  the  LPRS  also 
explicitly recognises the need for improved labour policy and administration, a 
role for labour-intensive public works, skills training, developing opportunities 
for  women  and  youth,  and  creating  workplace  programmes  to  address 
HIV/AIDS.  
 
The National Employment Policy 
 
  The LPRS, under the heading ‘generating productive employment,’ calls 
for a new National Employment Policy (NEP) to coordinate efforts at improving 
employment  opportunities  in  the  country.  Currently,  a  draft  NEP  has  been 
developed by the Ministry of Labour with technical assistance from the ILO. At 
the time of the assessment, the NEP needed to be submitted to cabinet structures 
for approval. After it has been approved by cabinet, the house and senate must 
pass it in order for the NEP to become national policy. 
 
  The  draft NEP  (April 2009)  includes  strategies  to address  immediate 
employment needs, through emergency employment programmes, and policies 
for  sustainable  employment  in  the  longer-term.  A  National  Bureau  of 
Employment is proposed to coordinate employment policies and to integrate 
such programmes into the national development strategy. The Bureau would 
also  link  employment  creation  to  infrastructure  projects  and  skills  building 
initiatives.  
 
  The medium-term employment policies in the NEP include a number of 
components: 
 
·  Skills and capacity building 
·  Revitalisation of agriculture and non-farm rural employment Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  38
·  Support to small-scale and informal enterprises 
·  Targeted employment and skills-building initiatives for youth, women, 
and the disabled 
 
In  many  respects,  the  policy  framework  of  the  NEP  mirrors  the  priorities 
outlined in the LPRS. Although still in draft form, several of the components of 
the NEP, particularly the emergency employment programmes, are relevant to 
addressing the negative effects of the economic crisis. We return to these policy 
issues later in the report. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  39Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  40
 
 
6.  Channels  through  which  the 
global  crisis  affects  the  Liberian 
economy 
 
Central government revenues and the budget 
 
  Pressures  on  fiscal  resources,  specifically  government  revenues, 
represent the primary macroeconomic channel through which the global crisis 
will affect Liberia. The negative impact on government revenues is directly a 
result of changes in commodity prices and international trade. In the 2009/10 
budget, international trade taxes account for approximately 50 percent of total 
tax revenue and ad valorum taxes on imports represent a significant component 
of these trade taxes. As noted above, the global crisis has reduced the price of 
imports  and  the  total  value  of  all  imports  into  Liberia.  Changes  in  global 
commodity prices therefore directly affect government revenues. In addition, 
taxes on personal corporate income are projected to account for 27 percent of 
tax  revenues  in  the  2009/10  budget.  To  the  extent  that  the  crisis  slows  the 
growth rate of the  Liberian economy, revenues from these sources will also 
decline. Non-tax government revenues, such as the once-off payments linked to 
concession agreements, could also be aversely affected by the crisis, although 
the expectation is that these extraordinary revenue items are reasonably secure. 
 
  There have been a number of recent changes to tax policy. The corporate 
and personal income tax rates have been reduced.
12 In addition, import duties on 
rice have been suspended. The reductions have been justified as a government 
fiscal response to the crisis – i.e. an effort to support domestic demand through 
tax  reductions.  We  will  examine  the  efficacy  of  this  approach  later  in  the 
discussion of policy responses. 
 
  The  negative  impact  of  the  crisis  on  government  revenues  has  been 
partly off-set by efforts to increase the efficiency of tax collection. Total tax 
revenues in the 2009/10 draft budget were projected to be 17 percent higher 
than the 2008/9 projection, although there is some concern that actual revenue 
collection will fall short of planned revenues due to the crisis. The measures 
undertaken to improve tax effort include improvements in import inspections, 
new systems to  minimise false receipts and similar tax avoidance strategies, 
                                                 
12    According to the President’s Budget Message for the 2009/10 budget, the expected revenue 
loss due to the reduction in the corporate and personal income tax is $14 million. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  41
better  enforcement  of  tax  payments  by  government  employees,  and  greater 
effort in collecting property and general sales taxes.  Although these changes 
help compensate for the impact of the crisis on government revenues, revenues 
would certainly be higher in the absence of the  global recession.  Moreover, 
these figures represent revenue projections – actual collections will depend on 
how the crisis plays itself out. 
 
  The impact on government revenues is critical because Liberia currently 
runs a cash-based budget – current expenditures must not exceed revenues plus 
any cash reserves. In the past several years, government revenues had exceeded 
expenditures, and a cushion of reserves was built up. However, those reserves 
are largely exhausted. Therefore, a significant decline in realised revenues will 
necessarily  lead  to  cuts  in  expenditures.  Liberia  does  not  currently  issue 
government securities and new domestic debt. There are efforts to establish a 
domestic capital market, but it will be some time before government securities 
can  be  issued.  In  the  meantime,  fiscal  space  is  limited  to  the  ability  of 
government to mobilise revenues. To the extent that the global crisis reduces 




Exports, international commodity prices, and exchange rates 
 
  The decline in global demand and the rapid drop in commodity prices 
represent the most significant channels through which the global crisis directly 
affects the Liberian economy. The value of rubber exports has declined, both 
due to a reduction in the quantity of rubber exported and the dramatic fall in 
global prices. Other commodity prices – for example, of iron ore, palm oil, and 
diamonds – have also fallen. These other commodities currently constitute a 
relatively  small  fraction  of  the  total  value  of  Liberia’s  exports.  However, 
significant increases in the production of iron ore, palm oil, and timber were 
expected to have occurred by now or to accelerate in the near future. The global 
crisis has caused a delay in the rejuvenation of these exports. One consequence 
of the global crisis, therefore, is a slowdown in new investment and rates of job 
creation that fall short of expectations. These issues are discussed with much 
greater precision in the sectoral analysis of the report. 
 
  In 2008, the estimated value of total exports was about 31 percent of 
GDP.
13  Figure  7  shows  the  trend  in  Liberian  exports  to  the  U.S.  and  E.U., 
measured in millions of U.S. dollars, from May 2008 to May 2009 (the export 
figures are based on ‘mirror’ data and represent the value of Liberian imports 
into the U.S. and E.U.)  The value of exports varies significantly from month-to-
month. Therefore, the figure includes the actual value of exports and a 3-month 
moving average of the value of exports. The 3-month average helps to smooth 
out the month-to-month variations and make the overall trend clearer. There has 
                                                 
13    IMF (2009). Liberia: Second Review under the Three-year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  42
been  a  significant  decline  in  Liberian  exports  to  these  two  major  markets, 
starting around October 2008. At this time it is uncertain whether exports will 




Figure 7. Trends in the value of Liberian exports to the U.S. and E.U. (US$), 




























exports (US+EU) 3 month moving average
 
Source: UN Comtrade database. 
 
 
  The decline in exports corresponds to a drop in the nominal exchange 
rate  (Liberian  dollars  to  U.S.  dollars).  Table  7  shows  the  end-of-month 
exchange rate from May 2008 to May 2009. The exchange rate was stable up 
until the end of 2008, but then began to depreciate. The depreciation became 
more pronounced in April and May 2009. For many economic activities, the 
widespread use of U.S. dollars means that the depreciation of the Liberian dollar 
would  not  have  had  a  significant  impact.  However,  small  enterprises  and 
individuals  in  informal  self-employment  may  have  been  adversely  affected, 
particularly if goods and inputs are purchased with U.S. dollars but the majority 
of their sales transactions are in Liberian dollars. 
 
 Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  43
 
 
Table 7. Nominal exchange rates(end of period),  
 
May 2008 – May 2009.  
   Exchange rate 
   $L/$US 
May 08  63.5 
Jun 08  63.5 
Jul 08  63.5 
Aug 08  63.5 
Sep 08  63.5 
Oct 08  63.5 
Nov 08  63.3 
Dec 08  64.0 
Jan 09  64.5 
Feb 09  64.5 
Mar 09  65.5 
Apr 09  66.5 
May 09  70.5 
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Liberia,  Fact  Sheet  on  Key  Economic  and  Financial  Indicators, 
various months. 
 
  The crisis led to the closing of the external credit lines which contributed 
to the decline in the exchange rate. Importers rely on trade credits to finance 
their  transactions.  When  overseas  credit  lines  became  less  accessible,  they 
turned  to  domestic  sources  of  trade  credit.  Demand  for  U.S.  dollars  within 
Liberia  increased,  and  this  would  have  contributed  to  a  depreciation  of  the 
nominal exchange rate. 
 
The  impact  on  commodity  prices  also  extends  to  import  prices  – 
including imports of fuel and rice. The fall in import prices generally represents 
a gain for Liberian households but, as we have already discussed, the reduction 
in  prices  has  direct  consequences  for  government  revenues.  The  decline  in 
import prices helps to off-set the decline in export revenues in terms of the 
overall trade balance. Lower import prices have also reduced the inflationary 
pressures that were evident in the second half of 2008. In particular, the global 
crisis appears to have put an end to the rapid increase in rice prices that was 
placing pressures on the living standards of families and households.  
 
However, there is a downside to the recent moderation in rice prices. 
Rice is arguably the most important commodity that Liberia produces and the 
volatility of prices could affect efforts to revitalise domestic rice production and 
may also dampen domestic production in a sector that holds key potential for 
jobs, national food security and household welfare.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  44
 
 
Foreign direct investment and concession agreements 
 
  In 2008, net foreign direct investment in Liberia amounted to about 24 
percent of GDP.
14 Foreign investment is concentrated in natural resource based 
exports – rubber being the most important – and a large share of foreign direct 
investment  is  linked  to  concession  agreements  that  are  negotiated  with  the 
government. During the commodity boom that preceded the global economic 
crisis, commodity prices and expected profits were high. It was envisioned that 
new  concessions  would  come  on  board,  based  on  Liberia’s  resource 
endowments – e.g. involving the production of iron ore, timber, rice, and palm 
oil. Some companies that won concessions have delayed investments because of 
the  collapse  of  global  commodity  prices  or  difficulties  to  obtain  finance.  In 
some  other  cases,  the  terms of  the  concession  agreements that  are  currently 
being negotiated may be less favourable than had originally been expected. A 
much more detailed discussion of the various concession agreements and the 
impact of the global crisis can be found in the sectoral analysis of this report. 
 
The rapid impact assessment found that the crisis is having an impact on 
concession  negotiations  and  investment  through  its  effect  on  world  market 
demand and availability of long term finance for investment projects in several 
crucial sectors. However, it also found that in a number of cases, the crisis is 
simply  adding  to  pre-existing  domestic  problems  or  is  being  used  as  a 
bargaining tool  by  potential  investors.  These  findings  strongly  argue  against 
granting ad hoc benefits to investors affected by the economic crisis. Instead, a 
more  advisable  strategy  is  a  dual  approach  of  continuing  to  improve  the 
investment climate and maintaining a strong emphasis on attracting reputable 
and financially sound companies to carry out long term investments. 
 
The foreign direct investment associated with the concession agreements 
brings a number of benefits to Liberia. Such investment creates much needed 
employment. In addition, many of the concession agreements also require the 
corporation  that  wins  the  bid  to  invest  in  infrastructure  (e.g.  roads  and 
revitalised rail lines) and areas of social development (e.g. schools). In some 
cases,  the  concession  agreements  include  a  once-off  direct  payment  to 
government. Such ‘extraordinary’ revenue items can be significant – amounting 
to  about  20  percent  of  the  projected  revenues  in  the  2009/10  budget.  The 
negotiated agreements also impact government revenues – and hence, the ability 
to  deliver  on  core  development  objectives  –  in  the  longer  term,  through 
provisions for royalty payments and corporate income tax rates.
15 
                                                 
14    IMF (2009). Liberia: Second Review under the Three-year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility. 
15    The immediate impact of the negotiations of many new concession agreements on current 
government tax revenues and royalty payments is likely to be minimal – apart from the once-off 
payments which are classified as extraordinary revenue items. In sectors such as iron ore and 
palm oil, new production associated with concession agreements is not expected to increase Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  45
 
A  slowdown  in  foreign  investment  attracted  through  the  concession 
agreements and the pressures for government to accept less favourable terms 
represent another channel through which the global economic crisis will affect 
Liberia.  At  the  current  time,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  with  any  certainty  the 
ultimate magnitude of this negative impact. The collapse of commodity prices 
has  already  affected  the  negotiation  and  implementation  of  concession 
agreements.  It  may  be  the  case  that  the  anticipated  foreign  investment  and 
employment  creation  will  still  be  realised,  but  at  a  slower  pace.  Also,  it  is 
important  to  recognise  that  not  all  of  the  delays  in  moving  the  concession 
agreements forward can be ascribed to the global crisis. Other factors (e.g. land 
tenure issues) have contributed to the difficulty in securing certain concessions 




  The Liberian economy receives substantial inflows of remittances. As 
the global crisis causes unemployment rates to rise and net worth to decline 
among Liberians working abroad, remittances flowing into Liberia come under 
pressure. Economic uncertainty can also reduce remittances – if Liberians living 
abroad increase their savings in response to economic instability. The Central 
Bank of Liberia maintains estimates of inflow and outflows of remittances.
16 
According to the 2008 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Liberia, over the 
11 month period, January to November 2008, recorded inflows of remittances 
totalled  US$  884  million  –  an  amount approximately  equal  to  the  country’s 
estimated  GDP.  Recent  trends  in  the  monthly  inflows  of  remittances  are 
illustrated  in  Figure  8  from  May  2008  to  May  2009.  Monthly  inflows  of 
remittances have declined beginning in the second half of 2008, as the crisis 
unfolded. As of March 2009, there appears to have been a slight recovery in the 
inflows of remittances. However, given the month-to-month fluctuations in the 
data, it is hard to say whether inflows will return to their previous levels any 
time soon. Also – unrecorded inflows of remittances would not be reflected in 
this  figure.  This  creates  an  added  layer  of  uncertainty  in  assessing  overall 
trends. 
                                                                                                                                  
significantly for several years. Therefore, the impact on revenues through royalties and 
corporate income taxes will take some time to manifest itself. 
16    Liberia also exhibits large outflows of remittances. Therefore, the net impact on the country 
is much smaller than the estimates of inflows would indicate. One source of the outflows is the 
large UNMIL presence in the country. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  46
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  The decline in remittances will reduce domestic purchasing power and 
overall  demand  in  the  Liberian  economy.  Small  business  and  informal 
enterprises  that  cater  to  the  domestic  market  will  be  directly  affected,  since 
many  of  these  businesses  are  in  non-tradable  (i.e.  not  exported)  service 
activities.  In  addition,  lower  levels  of  remittances  would  reduce  aggregate 
financial inflows into Liberia and contribute to short-term balance of payments 
pressures. 
 
Official development assistance 
 
  Table 8 shows recent statistics of total aid expressed as a percent of 
gross national income for selected low-income countries. Liberia receives a high 
level of official development assistance (ODA) and aid relative to the size of its 
economy,  compared  to  other  countries  at  similar  levels  of  economic 
development. In 2008, the value of net transfers from donors was estimated to Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  47
be about 130 percent of GDP.
17 One possible consequence of the current global 
recession is a reduction in development assistance, as high income countries 
prioritise pressing domestic concerns over international donor support. Given 
the high levels of development assistance, Liberia is potentially vulnerable to a 
withdrawal  or  reduction  of  aid  flows.  At  this  time,  donor  commitments  to 
Liberia appear to have been largely unaffected by the global crisis and the broad 
consensus is that Liberia will continue to receive the expected level of support 
from its major donors over the next year or two.  
 
Table 8. Official Development Assistance and  
Official Aid as a Percentage of GNI (2006). 
 
Liberia  54.4% 
Burundi  47.7% 
Afghanistan  35.7% 
Mozambique  26.2% 
Sierra Leone  25.7% 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  25.2% 
Timor-Leste  24.7% 
Rwanda  23.6% 
Malawi  21.4% 
Uganda  16.7% 
Mali  14.9% 
Ethiopia  14.7% 
Zambia  14.6% 
Tanzania  14.5% 
Burkina Faso  14.1% 
Madagascar  13.9% 
Nigeria  11.3% 
Ghana  9.2% 
Senegal  9.1% 
Cambodia  7.6% 
Nepal  5.7% 
Kenya  4.1% 
Vietnam  3.1% 
Bangladesh  1.9% 
Cote d’Ivoire  1.5% 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2008. 
 
Although  ODA  and  aid  commitments  are  currently  holding  up  well, 
there is no guarantee that the same level of support will continue in the medium-
term. Therefore, it is essential capitalise on current commitments to realise the 
immediate development priorities as outlined in the poverty reduction strategy. 
Very  little  of  Liberia’s  development  assistance  comes  in  the  form  of  direct 
                                                 
17    IMF (2009). Liberia: Second Review under the Three-year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  48
budget support. In some cases, specialised agencies have been set up within 
government to administer donor funds. For example, a special implementation 
unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Public Works has been created to oversee 
certain  infrastructure  projects  with  an  aim  to  build  capacity  within  the 
Ministry.
18 Other donors avoid channelling aid through government altogether, 
preferring direct project management. The record of this ‘project’ approach to 
development  in  achieving  sustainable  improvements  in  African  countries 




Financial sector and financial markets 
 
  The  Liberian  financial  sector  is  not  well  integrated  into  the  global 
financial  system.  The  civil  war  effectively  shut  Liberia  out  of  international 
financial markets. Banks are the dominant type of financial institution in the 
sector, but they have practically no exposure to the assets and financial products 
that are at the center of the current crisis. According to the Central Bank of 
Liberia, some banks maintain external credit lines at foreign banks that have 
been affected to some extent by the crisis, but the banking sector as a whole has 
been largely insulated from the global financial turmoil. The banking sector in 
Liberia is largely foreign owned, but ownership is mostly regional. The large 
international financial institutions at the center of the financial crisis do not have 
a significant ownership stake in the sector.  
 
  Moreover, the credit extended by the commercial banking institutions is 
primarily  used  to  finance  international  trade.  The  transmission  mechanisms 
through  which  the financial  sector  impacts  the  real  economy  are  weak.  The 
banking sector is highly liquid and is well capitalised, further protecting the 
sector from problems that could arise from the global crisis.  
 
  The  sudden  reversal  of  short-term  capital  flows  –  e.g.  portfolio 
investment  –  is  another  channel  through  which  the  global  crisis  can  affect 
developing countries. A rapid outflow of capital can result in an uncontrolled 
depreciation  of  the  currency  with  devastating  impacts  on  domestic  financial 
institutions, the liabilities of the public and private sectors, and real productive 
activity and employment. Liberia current does not have a functioning capital 
market and receives virtually no portfolio investment.  
In short, the Liberian financial markets do not constitute a significant channel 
through which the economic crisis has affected the economy. 
 
It is also worth noting that many macroeconomic indicators in Liberia 
have not been affected by the global crisis. For example, nominal interest rates 
have  remained  relatively  constant  over  the  past  year  (Table  9),  another 
                                                 
18    The infrastructure projects that are being implemented through the SIU are largely funded 
by the World Bank. Financing for such projects are channeled through the PMFU (Project 
Management Finance Unit) housed at the Ministry of Finance. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  49
indication that the impact of the crisis on the domestic financial sector has been 
minimal. Inflation rates have fallen due the reduction in the prices of imports, 
particularly food and fuel. As discussed earlier, there has been some downward 
pressure on the nominal exchange rate. However, the overall macroeconomic 
environment has remained relatively stable.  
 
 
Table 9. Annual inflation rates and average lending rates, 
May 2008 to May 2009. 
Inflation Lending rates
(percent - annual) (percent - annual)
May 08 19.2% 14.2%
Jun 08 22.0% 14.4%
Jul 08 21.3% 14.4%
Aug 08 26.5% 13.9%
Sep 08 20.0% 15.8%
Oct 08 18.6% 14.3%
Nov 08 15.5% 14.2%
Dec 08 9.4% 14.3%
Jan 09 6.4% 14.1%
Feb 09 7.0% 14.3%
Mar 09 6.9% 14.0%
Apr 09 7.8% 14.3%
May 09 7.7% 14.2%  
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Liberia,  Fact  Sheet  on  Key  Economic  and  Financial  Indicators, 
various months. 




7.  Overview  of  the  Employment 
Impacts of the Crisis 
 
The crisis has already had a substantial effect on employment in Liberia. 
The  findings  of  this  assessment  suggest  that  the  impact  will  be  felt  most 
strongly  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  individuals  self-employed  in 
smallholder agricultural production and those working in informal employment. 
In the rubber sector alone, the crisis will directly impact the livelihoods of up to 
60,000  smallholder  producers  and  thousands  of  contract  workers.  The 
employment effects of the crisis will not appear to be as severe at this stage as 
some  may  have  expected  if  we  only  analyse  the  absolute  reduction  in  the 
number  of  formal,  permanent  jobs.  This  underscores  that  it  is  essential  to 
understand the impact of the crisis on Liberians in all forms of employment. For 
informal  employment,  self-employment,  and  smallholder  production,  the 
impacts  on  employment  and  household  incomes  are  harder  to  assess  with 
precision  because  of  a  lack  of  information.  In  these  activities,  the  negative 
consequences will most likely manifest themselves in terms of lower and more 
uncertain  earnings,  and  higher  risks  of  poverty,  rather  than  a  decline  in 
employment numbers.  
 
The  effects  on  the  well-being  of  the  population  of  this  loss  of 
employment  income  are  more  severe,  since  many  dependents  rely  on  the 
earnings from each individual in the labour force. When household income is 
reduced, it is likely that additional family members will enter the labour market 
to bolster family income – often working in small scale farming and informal 
trading. The main concern is the inability of the labour market to absorb new 
entrants,  such  as  youth,  as  the  economic  crisis  will  tend  to  increase  labour 
supply while lowering labour demand, thereby increasing the tendency towards 
more  vulnerable  employment.  When  supply  overtakes  demand,  earning  may 
also fall, for example in informal trading. The impact on the labour market will 
be to perpetuate and deepen the ‘vicious cycle’ of long working hours, low pay, 
and low productivity associated with vulnerable employment.  
 
Two of the natural resource sectors affected most directly by the crisis 
are the rubber sector and mining related activities (since actual production of 
iron  ore  has  not  recommenced).  The  assessment  estimates  that  over  4,000 
workers  in  these  sectors  are  effectively  out  of  work.  The  reductions  in 
employment are concentrated among contract workers. The job losses among 
permanent employees are less pronounced. In the rubber sector, about 60,000 Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  51
smallholder producers face rapidly deteriorating economic conditions that will 
affect their earnings and the viability of their livelihoods in the future. 
 
Outside of the agricultural and natural resource sectors, businesses have 
experienced  a  slump  in  demand.  On  average,  businesses  interviewed  have 
reported about a 20 percent decrease in turnover from the previous year. For 
small  scale  enterprises  and  informal workers,  many  of which  operate  in  the 
service sector catering to domestic markets, the fall in demand will decrease 
earnings  and  productivity.  This  decline  in  the  domestic  market  will  directly 
affect  many  own-account  and  contributing  family  workers  in  terms  of  their 
contributions  to  household  incomes  and  family  well-being  –  the  two 
employment categories which provide the vast majority of employment.  
 
Local  businesses  complain  that  profit  margins  are  declining  due  to 
intense competition among traders selling the same goods, a possible result of 
new  labour  market  entrants  working  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of  household 
income. The fall in demand and the higher cost of imports, in part due to the 
exchange  rate  depreciation,  has  made  many  petty  traders  more  vulnerable, 
leading to increased bankruptcy. Marketers are leaving the tables as they fall 
short on cash to maintain inventories, and more women are entering the markets 
trying  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of  family  income.  Umbrella  business 
organisations report a substantial drop in their membership dues as a result of 
the decline in consumption spending, slower economic activity, and business 
failures. In addition, there appears to have been a contraction in the construction 
industry because of the global crisis. 
 
The findings of the worker interviews suggest that most Liberians are 
feeling  the  pinch  of  the  current  economic  crisis.  Employed  workers  are 
experiencing additional workloads without extra compensation and are fearful 
of losing their jobs at any time. They also help support redundant workers in 
addition to their own families. In all households, women play a major role in 
supplementing incomes of employed and unemployed male workers, primarily 
through informal employment. Such pressures can also lead to decreased school 
attendance,  as  children  and  youth  are  needed  to  assist  in  the  household  or 
support  income  generating  activities  and  the  cost  of  school  is  no  longer 
affordable. Some workers would return to their villages if viable alternatives 
exist there. International migration was not high on the list of coping strategies, 
but many workers would relocate within Liberia to find work. 
  
Trade unions are advocating for workers who have been laid off without 
receiving  back  pay  or  those  which  have  not  received  benefits  outlined  in 
collective bargaining agreements, but some of these grievances date back prior 
to the onset of the global crisis. The patience of some retrenched workers who 
have not received severance benefit packages or the wage and salary arrears 
owed to them is running out. There have been some strikes and riots in the 
rubber industry and the risk of further instability and violence is high if the 
government does not facilitate the receipt of worker benefits across the affected 
sectors.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  52
 
Apart from actual job losses, one negative consequence of the crisis is a 
slowdown in the job creation that was expected to have taken place through the 
negotiation  of  the  concession  agreements.  Although  many  concession 
agreements  are  still  on-track  –  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  timber 
concessions  –  their  full  implementation  may  be  delayed.  Many  of  these 
agreements  are  central  to  the  Liberia  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy’s  goal  to 
revitalise the Liberian economy and generate productive employment. At this 
stage, it is difficult to assess to what extent the economic crisis will affect the 
negotiations of new agreements, the renegotiations of existing agreements, and 
the implementation of the agreements that have been finalised. 
 
 
Employment trends from government records 
 
Interviews with workers, employers, and government officials provided 
most of the information on the employment impacts of the crisis. However, 
these interviews were supplemented by careful research into recent government 
documents to shed further light on employment trends. Although timely survey 
data on employment in Liberia is not available to assess the impact of the crisis, 
information on employment is routinely submitted to the Ministry of Labour 
and the Ministry of Finance. As part of the rapid assessment, employment data 
for 138 large scale establishments was assembled from these records.  
 
The 138 companies fall into the category of large enterprises which, in 
this case, means that their annual turnover is over 30 million Liberian Dollars.
19 
Although there are more than 138 large enterprises operating in Liberia, not all 
companies  report  their  total  number  of  employees  to  the  government.  In 
addition, employers often do not submit complete employment figures or do so 
inconsistently each  month. Therefore, information for only  a subset of large 
enterprises is available. Since information may not be available each month, 
documenting trends in employment over the duration of the crisis is not possible 
for all firms.  
 
Despite these limitations, the government records do provide us with 
additional information on employment trends. For many of the companies for 
which data exist, the number of employees is more or less stable over the period 
May 2008 to May 2009. That is, there is no evidence from the government 
records  that  there  have  been  significant  layoffs  among  large  enterprises  in 
response to the crisis. However, there are two exceptions: companies in rubber 
and iron ore sector.  In these two key sectors, there is evidence of a loss of 
employment, with most of the lay offs coming from contractors and not from 
permanent  staff.  This  data  confirms  the  information  compiled  from  the 
interviews. 
                                                 
19    Information on small and medium sized enterprises is also available, but the analysis was 
not completed at the time of this writing. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  53Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  54
 
8.  Sectoral analysis  
The following section reviews the situation in six sectors using available 
trade  data  and  relying  heavily  on  personal  interviews  to  obtain  information, 
especially concerning the employment situation and the outlook for concession 
agreements. The sectors are rubber, rice, palm oil, iron ore, timber, and gold. 
The order in which each sector is discussed depends, first, on the degree to 
which the crisis has impacted existing employment in the sector and, second, on 
the  overall  employment  potential  of  the  sector  (including  employment  that 
would be generated through the expansion of production in the future). In each 
case,  an  overview  of  the  sector  is  presented,  followed  by  a  discussion  of 
employment issues relating to the crisis and an assessment of the outlook for the 
sector.  Four  of  the  sectors  are  primarily  export-oriented:  rubber,  iron  ore, 
timber, and gold. For rice and palm oil, there is a significant domestic market in 
addition to a possible export market. 
 
The strategy for revitalizing the Liberian economy, as outlined in the 
LPRS, depends, in part, on a renewal of natural resource based exports. In the 
years immediately preceding the crisis, Liberia’s exports had been recovering 
from the extremely low levels that prevailed during the years of civil war and 
conflict up to 2003. Table 10 shows that, by 2008, the total value of exports had 
increased significantly from the level in 2005. In terms of specific sectors, there 
are  exceptions  to  the  trend  of  export  growth –  e.g.  iron ore.  However, new 
production of iron ore has not commenced in Liberia and exports in recent years 
come from drawing down existing stocks. Cocoa, gold and diamonds have had 
notable increases since 2005. For other commodities – e.g. palm oil and timber 
– the export potential is sizeable, but current exports are negligible.  
 
Table 10. Value of exports by commodity ($US), 2005-2008. 
2005 2006 2007 2008
Rubber $171,426 $239,100 $234,017 $265,792
Scrap metal $7,882 $9,718 $15,147 $19,320
Cocoa $3,405 $1,272 $2,265 $10,390
Gold $191 $5 $1,529 $9,733
Diamonds --- --- $1,546 $7,433
Iron-ore $24,253 $2,134 $2,960 $5,818
Wood --- $37 $52 $617
Palm oil $123 $366 $372 $211
Rice $708 $142 $137 $140
Other $12,991 $29,650 $11,083 $19,852
Total $220,979 $282,425 $269,108 $339,306  






Rubber is currently Liberia’s most important export commodity by far 
and the value of rubber exports totaled US$266 million or about 80 per cent of 
total  exports  in  2008.  The  five  largest  companies  in  Liberia  operate  in  this 
sector  and  it  is  estimated  that  more  than  20,000  people  are  employed  by 
commercial rubber farms and up to 60,000 smallholder households are involved 
in some way in growing rubber trees. Exports grew modestly in 2008, but with 
the onset of the crisis, the world market price for rubber and the quantity of 
Liberia’s  rubber  exports  declined  substantially.  Demand  for  tires  directly 
influences demand for rubber, so demand is strongly linked to the health of the 
global automobile industry – an industrial sector hit hard by the crisis. 
 
Figure  9  presents  selected  indicators  for  the  world  market  price  for 
Liberian  rubber.  According  to  the  World  Bank’s  Global  Economic  Monitor 
database of world commodity prices, the world market rubber price peaked at 
US$3.22/kg in June 2008 and then dropped dramatically in the last quarter of 
2008 to reach US$1.20 in December 2009. Since then, it has recovered slowly 
and  reached  US$1.69  in  May  2009.  Predictions  from  the  Global  Economic 
Monitor suggest that it will continue to increase slowly but remain well below 
its peak during the years of the commodity boom. 
 





























World market price for rubber (source: Global Economic Monitor)
Annual average world market price for rubber and predicted future price (source: Global Economic
Monitor)
Unit value of EU rubber imports from Liberia (source: Eurostat)
 Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  56
 
 
Trends in European Union rubber imports from Liberia largely confirm 
the validity of these world market figures for Liberian rubber, although with a 
time lag of about 3 months. This is not surprising given that import data is 
gathered at the time of physical importation whereas the world market price is 
determined by current buying and selling in the market.  
 
Figure 10 shows Liberian exports to the EU and US both in terms of 
quantity and value. The drop in the last few months is significant, not just in 
value, but also in terms of the actual quantity exported. In the last three month 
with data availability (Feb-Apr 09), exports to the European Union declined by 
56 percent in total value and 25 percent in quantity. 
 
 












































Value of rubber exports to the US (source: USITC)
Value of rubber exports to the EU (source: Eurostat)
Quantity of rubber exports to the US (source: USITC)





Companies in the sector have reportedly been affected by the 60 percent 
decline  in  prices  and  have  cancelled  contracts  with  suppliers,  and  these 
cancellations have led to some cutbacks in the employment of contract workers. 
Estimates at one plantation indicate that up to 2,000 full-time and contractual 
workers have been laid off, 25-30 per cent of which are women. Focus group Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  57
discussions revealed that the majority of those laid off were contractual workers 
and much easier to release since they are considered to be self-employed.  
 
Smallholder rubber plantations have also been affected and the impact 
has  led  to  shut  downs  or  drastic  reductions  in  activity.  The  Ministry  of 
Agriculture has indicated that many of the smaller Liberian owned producers 
have  had  to lay  off  people and significantly  downsize  their operations. One 
manager of a plantation employing 600 people said that he had not yet made 
any lay-offs, but was trying to negotiate a 30 per cent wage reduction with his 
workers to be able to keep them employed.  
 
Relations with some employers are very tense with unrest on two major 
plantations,  leading  to  destruction  of  a  police  station  at  one  site  and  the 
vandalizing of another’s fleet of vehicles due to the death of one worker while 
in custody of company security. Another major concern on one plantation is the 
alleged  default  of  the  employer  on  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  of 
retiring workers. In one case, a plantation was unable to pay its workers the 
salary arrears owned to them – industrial relations deteriorated and the workers 
went on strike. The government has agreed to finance the payment of the arrears 
in  order  to  prevent  any  further  unrest  that  could  have  compromised  a  new 
concession agreement.   
 
Worker interviews suggest that there is increased pressure on employees 
due to higher workloads and halting of overtime pay. Some laid off workers are 
re-hired on a casual daily-wage basis, without the usual benefits of housing, free 
schooling  for  children,  a  rice  allowance,  and  medical  support.  There  is  a 
constant fear of possible layoffs and concern over how workers will make ends 
meet. There are also claims of sexual exploitation of female contract workers on 




This is a crucial time for rubber because the government is currently 
beginning  to  re-negotiate  concession  agreements  with  two  of  the  major 
plantations. Furthermore, most rubber trees  are  approaching the end of  their 
economic life and major investments in replanting would have to be made now 
(including by smallholders) to secure the sectors future. This requires significant 
upfront investment because it takes about seven years before a rubber tree can 
be profitably utilised. Smallholders depend on the out-grower schemes of the 
large plantations to obtain finance and materials for replanting.   
 
In the ongoing concession negotiations, companies have used the crisis 
as an argument to push for more favourable terms, and the bargaining position 
of the government is weakened given the urgent need to secure employment in 
the short-term. Of particular concern is the companies’ resistance to provide 
finance and other support to smallholders to replant rubber trees. This should 
remain a priority for the government in the concession negotiations given the 
importance  for  rural  development  and  poverty  reduction.    Currently, Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  58
negotiations between the government and the rubber plantations are ongoing to 
establish a rubber fund  for that purpose that would be funded jointly  by all 
companies  and  the  government.  However,  the  specifics  of  the  funding 
arrangements and timing remain uncertain.  
 
Because of the crisis and the recent price fluctuations, there is a lot of 
insecurity, especially among smallholders, whether to invest into replanting of 
rubber trees. Some smallholders are said to have already chopped down their 
rubber trees to plant other crops instead. There is an urgent need to reassure 
investors  of  the future  of the  sector for  them  to  make necessary  investment 
decisions now. If the planned rubber fund becomes available soon and starts 
moving forward aggressively, it could serve this purpose. On the other hand, it 
is not clear that rubber is the most favourable option for all smallholders and 
diversification  into  new  export  crops  would  also  help  to  manage  the  risk 
associated with fluctuating rubber prices. The Ministry of Agriculture, together 
with donors, is already  supporting programmes to help smallholders move a 
portion of their production into cocoa. This represents a concrete intervention 
that could be expanded in response to the crisis and which also contributes to 







Rice  is  Liberia’s  most  important  food  crop  and  has  tremendous 
importance for food security and political stability in a country where, in 2006, 
81 percent of the rural population was found to be vulnerable to food insecurity 
and another 10 percent acutely affected by it.
20 Since the rice riots of April 14, 
1979, it has been considered a political crop
21.  Regardless of the world market 
price, Liberian Presidents have made concerted efforts to ensure that the price of 
rice  is  affordable  by  the  population.  As  such,  the  price  is  determined  by 
government through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Ad hoc calculations based on figures reported in Ministry of Agriculture 
indicate  that  employment  in  rice  cultivation  is  currently  equivalent  to  about 
380,000 jobs. Given that rice is farmed mainly by smallholders who often plant 
a number of different crops, it is reasonable to assume that these jobs will be 
stretched among a much higher number of people who are engaged in multiple 
livelihood activities. Based on estimates in the same Department of Agriculture 
report, if  Liberia were to reach self-sufficiency  in rice (assuming a  constant 
labour /land ratio), this would generate the equivalent of an additional 470,000 
                                                 
20 Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008.  
21 A surge in rice prices in 1979 contributed to Liberia's descent into chaos, sparking riots and a 
political crisis leading to the coup d’état that brought President Samuel Doe to power in 1980.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  59
jobs.
 22 While these are extremely rough estimates, they demonstrate that rice 
cultivation,  apart  from  its  importance  for  food  security,  has  a  tremendous 
potential for employment creation. It is important to recognise that smallholder 
production of rice is often vulnerable employment, dominated by own-account 
and  contributing  family  workers.  Therefore,  policies  to  support  productivity 




As shown in Figure 11, the Global Economic Monitor reports that the 
price for a ton of rice (Thailand, 5% broken) was stable for years at around 
$300, but then tripled in 2008 to reach $907 in April 2008. Since then, it has 
declined again, but has remained above $500 since reaching the earlier peak and 
is showing no sign of returning to its pre-2008 levels.  
 































Rice, Thailand, 5% broken ($/ton, source: Global Economic Monitor)




                                                 
22   These ad hoc employment estimates are based on the report: Ministry of Agriculture (2006), 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector.  According to the report, there are 
currently 104,100 
hectares of uplands and 75,000 hectares of swampland under cultivation for rice production. The 
labour-to-land ratio is estimated to be 1.8 workers/hectare on upland and 2.6 on swampland. The 
same report estimates that in order for Liberia to reach self-sufficiency in rice production, the 
area under cultivation would have to increase by another 128,000 hectares of upland and 92,000 
hectares of swampland, which, using the same labour-to-land ratios, would mean an additional 
470,000 jobs. 
23    Productivity improvements may reduce the number of jobs associated with an expansion of 
smallholder rice production, but will improve the quality of jobs if smallholders are able to 
capture, at least in part, the benefits associated with higher productivity. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  60
Liberia is currently a net importer of rice. According to the Ministry of 
Commerce in 2008 almost US$200 million had to be spent on importing rice, 
following  the  spike  in  international  food  prices  and  the  continuing  strong 
demand that could not be met by domestic production. While the country’s bill 
for rice imports can be expected to fall in 2009 given the decrease in the world 
market price for rice, it would still amount to about US$150 million if the same 
quantity as 2008 is imported at a world market price of US$500 per ton. The 
Ministry of Commerce also reported that the government has recently purchased 
substantial  amounts  of  rice  that  should  suffice  till  March  2010  and  the 
Government of Japan recently donated US$30 million in rice. This contribution 
is to be sold on the local market and proceeds channelled back into domestic 
agriculture.  
 
There are presently three major Liberian companies importing rice into 
the country. Importers noted that they lost close to US$20 million in the first 
quarter of 2009, as a result of the dive in the global price of rice per metric ton 
and  pressures  from  the  government  to  keep  domestic  rice  prices  low.  The 
companies were subsequently not in the position to pay their suppliers.  These 
payments have been rescheduled over a period of three years beginning late 
2009,  but  it  raises  concern  over  continued  access  to  credit  to  finance  rice 
imports into Liberia. Currently, local banks are not able to finance very large 
consignments of rice imports.  
   
Employment issues 
 
The largest employment effects in the sector will come from efforts to 
revitalise smallholder production. However, there are also examples of large-
scale rice production that have begun to operate in Liberia. Two companies are 
presently engaged in mechanised rice production in Liberia, applying capital-
intensive  production  techniques  in  a  sector  that  could  otherwise  generate  a 
significantly larger number of new jobs. One of these companies reported that 
the increase in the price of imported items, especially spare parts and fuel has 
constrained operations. As a result, some machines are lying idle, the usage of 
fertilisers and herbicides has been reduced, and other cost cutting measures put 
in  place.  No  workers  have  been  laid off  to  date  and  the  company  does not 
foresee any layoffs in the near future. The company currently has 400 workers, 
mostly  unskilled,  earning  average  monthly  wages  of  US$100.  The  company 
intends to use the by-products from rice growing to generate energy for a US$ 
10.2 million rice mill. In spite of the increase in the cost of relevant inputs, they 
believe that a 50 kg bag of milled rice will not exceed US$24.00 in the worst 
case scenario. 
 
The second foreign-owned company is producing rice in Grand Cape 
Mount County on a small parcel of 200 hectares of land given to them by the 
government. Little information was provided on the present status of production 
except for setbacks due to land tenure issues raised by the host community. In 
both companies, the situation of the workers has not changed significantly with 




Rice  growing  is  arguably  the  most  important  sector  of  the  Liberian 
economy, both in terms of food security and employment creation. The sector is 
affected by a number of well-known problems, including undefined land tenure 
rights and deficient rural infrastructure, which cannot be attributed to the current 
economic  crisis.  However,  even  though  the  economic  crisis  may  have 
contributed to reducing the price of imported rice, it also reinforced the urgent 
need to create more employment, and rice is probably the most promising sector 
of the economy to do this at the required scale in the short run. Thus, the crisis 
should not divert attention from the fact that the restoration of rice growing in 
Liberia is a top-priority.  
 
The current rice concessions are using a mechanised farming approach 
generating  less  than  1,000  jobs  between  them.  More  labour  intensive 
approaches should be sought for large scale farming, especially considering the 
price  of  imported  heavy  machinery,  fuel  and  spare  parts,  and  the  expertise 






According to the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) of Liberia 
carried out in 2008, there are currently some 100,000 hectares under cultivation 
for palm oil, approximately 75,000 hectares in smallholder production and the 
rest cultivated by medium size Liberian owned firms. Liberia currently produces 
about 35,000 tons of crude palm oil and imports another 7,000. There are no 
reliable estimates of total employment in the sector, but a rough  calculation 
suggests that employment equivalent to 15,000 full-time jobs exists in palm oil 
cultivation. 
 
There are currently no significant palm oil exports from Liberia but the 
sector has major potential for import substitution and export growth. As shown 
in Figure 12, after being relatively stable between $400 and $500/ton, the price 
for palm oil skyrocketed in 2007 and early 2008, reaching a peak of $1,250 in 
March 2008. With the beginning of the economic crisis, it dropped dramatically 
and in November 2008 reached a low point of $488/ton, but ever since, it has 
been recovering steadily, climbing to $800 again in May 2009. Projections from 
the  Global  Economic  Monitor  see  the  price  of  palm  oil  making  a  gradual 
recovery over the next several years. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  62
 


































Unit value of EU imports from the world of palm oil for food preparation (US$/ton, source:
Eurostat)
Average annual world market price for palm oil and forecast (US$ / ton, source: Global Economic
Monitor)
World market price for palm oil (US$/ton, source: Global Economic Monitor)
Unit value of EU imports from the world of palm oil for technical use (US$/ton, source: Eurostat)
 
 
The analysis of unit values of EU imports of palm oil  roughly confirm 
these numbers with a lag of about 3 months (given that Liberia is currently not 
exporting palm oil to the EU, this is based on imports from all trading partners).  
Import figures for palm oil from the EU have been volatile over the course of 
the crisis. Imports in the first three months of 2009 are 2 percent below the same 





The  initial  impact  of  the  crisis  on  the  industry  was  reduced  oil 
production  in  response  to  lower  global  demand.  The negative  impact  of the 
crisis has been significant for local producers. However, domestic prices are still 
high in range of L$ 1,200 - 1,500 (US$ 17 - 21) per five gallons due to a chronic 
West African supply  gap that has been  filled to date by  Malaysian imports. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  63
Liberia is in a strong competitive position to meet local and regional demand 
due to lower transport costs.  Global oil demand is also bouncing back with 
higher world prices expected over the next six months because palm oil is one 
of the lowest priced food oils to produce and remains profitable at lower prices.   
 
The impact on workers is mixed, and appears to vary from employer to 
employer. One company, which is in the pre-operational phase, has retained all 
of  its  workers.  Another  company,  which  has  mainly  rubber  activities,  is 
dormant. It will be scaling up its operation soon, with potential to create around 
15,000 employment opportunities over the next five years. However, small scale 




There are currently four concessions for large palm oil plantations to be 
set  up  in  Liberia,  but  they  are  not  yet  operational.  There  is  strong  investor 
interest  in  the  sector.  One  investor,  which  is  taking  over  an  older  rubber 
plantation, is diversifying 80 per cent of its US$ 849 million investment into 
new  oil  palm  plantations,  a  vegetable  oil  processing  factory  and  social 
infrastructure while it  replants  a  portion  of the  old rubber  plantations.  Total 
acreage awarded in the concession agreement is 220,000 hectares in Bomi, Cape 
Mount, Gbarpolu and Bong counties. The company has pledged to improve and 
centralise social services and to carry out development activities as a means of 
improving community relations. Total employment potential is estimated to be 
upwards  to  30,000  workers  for  both  palm  oil  and  rubber.  This  concession 
agreement was recently approved by the legislature. 
 
Given that the world market price has already recovered substantially 
and the outlook remains bright (even if the peak-prices from early 2008 are 
unlikely to be achieved again in the short run) these investments are expected to 
move ahead as planned. There is currently no potential for concession holders to 
threaten lay-offs  given that investments have not started  yet, which puts the 
government  in  a  much  stronger  bargaining  position  in  future  negotiations.  
However  there  is  a  need  for  infrastructure  investment  to  facilitate  the 
transportation  of  the  projected  output  from  all  the  concessions  under 






Liberia  does  not  currently  produce  iron  ore,  but  there  are  two 
international companies holding mining concessions and a third one is currently 
being  auctioned.  One  company  has  already  begun  its  investment  and  is 
expecting  to  start  shipping  iron  ore  in  2011,  the  other  one  is  supposed  to 
commence operations later this year.  
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As  Figure  13  shows,  the  world  market  price  for  iron  ore  has  been 
affected by the economic crisis. The Global Economic Monitor only reports an 
annual price for iron ore. This is probably because the reference price for iron 
ore is determined every year through negotiations between the major suppliers 
and the steel mills that buy the raw ore. The Global Economic Monitor data 
reports that after increasing to $140 a ton in 2008, the price fell to $100 in 2009 
and it is expected to decline further to $80 in 2010 and $75/ton in 2015, which 
is comparable to its level in 2005.  
 
Figure 13. Selected indicators of world market price for Liberian iron ore, US$ / 









































Unit value of EU imports from the world of iron ore of the type exported by Liberia before
the war (US$/ton, source: Eurostat)
Average annual world market price for iron ore and forecast (US$ / ton, source: Global
Economic Monitor)
World market price of steel (index, 1990=100, source: Global Economic Monitor)
 
Unit values for EU iron ore imports (from the rest of the world) of the 
same type exported by Liberia before the war show a parallel trend, although 
the price generally falls a bit below the world market price. This is probably due 
to the fact that this data refers to non-agglomerated iron ore, which is what 
Liberia exported before the war, which typically commands a lower price. It is 
reasonable to assume a lag of about three month between the spot price on the 
world market and the unit values reported for these imports by the EU. After 
reaching a peak of $116/ton in December 2008, unit values dropped to $89 in 
March 2009.  
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The main driver for the world market price for iron ore is the demand 
and price for steel. In the case of Liberia, the link is even more direct because 
the companies that have acquired concessions for iron ore mining in Liberia so 
far are steel companies mining their own raw materials. Figure 13 also shows 
the world market price for steel which, after peaking at 341 percent of its 1990 
level in August 2008 has declined constantly ever since and reached a level of 
214 percent of its 1990 level in May 2009.  
 
Import data from the EU, presented in Figure 14, show a dramatic drop 
in demand  after the beginning of the  economic crisis. After being  relatively 
stable  in quantity terms  between  2005  and  early  2008,  imports into  the  EU 
dropped by 55 per cent in quantity terms and 46 per cent in value terms between 
the first three month of 2008 and the first three month of 2009. This provides an 
indication of the dynamics in one major import market. 
 
 
Figure 14. Value and quantity of EU imports from the world of the type of iron 



































































Value of EU imports from the world of iron ore type exported by Liberia before the war
(US$, source: Eurostat)
Quantity of EU imports from the world of iron ore type exported by Liberia before the
war (tons, source: Eurostat)
 




Although  iron  ore  production  has  not  resumed  in  Liberia,  the  global 
financial  crisis  has  had  negative  impacts  on  the  preparations  for  future 
production, leading to work force reductions and the suspension of road and 
railway rehabilitation investments tied to the concession agreements. Interviews 
suggest  that  one  company  has  laid  off  80  full  time  workers  and  1,200 
contractual workers in Liberia (with 9,000 employees laid off by this company 
worldwide).  Approximately  80  to  85  percent  of  the  expatriate  workforce  in 
Liberia has been relocated or laid off. The company is currently maintaining a 
work  force  of  about  1,000  in  Liberia,  including  460  full  time  employees, 
security  guards  and  community  contractors  in  order  to  be  ready  to  bring 
operations back to full potential again. Apart from low world market demand 
for steel and iron ore, this company is also struggling with cash flow problems 
resulting from the global liquidity crunch, the contraction in the availability of 
credit, and a drop in the company’s share price. 
 
The current focus is therefore on cost cutting measures and remaining 
prepared to scale up activities if the situation improves, but the company is 
already delayed in meeting the employment requirements from their Minerals 
Development Agreement with the government. The government is monitoring 
the situation carefully and is prepared to legally enforce the provisions of the 
concession  agreement  as  necessary.  The  company  has  submitted  a  revised 
business plan.  They are optimistic that the situation will improve in the near 
future.  If  so,  they  intend  to  employ  3,500  workers  once  mining  operations 




The company that won the second iron ore concession is supposed to 
start operations in Liberia before the end of the year and up to now has given no 
indication  that  they  will  not  do  so,  but  the  Ministry  of  Lands,  Mining,  and 
Energy  (MLME)  assumes  that  they  are  1-2  months  behind  schedule.  It  was 
reported that, after winning the bid, the company approached the government to 
re-negotiate some provisions of their concession agreement regarding royalty 
payments due to the impacts of the economic crisis.  
 
A third mining concession was opened for bidding in 2008 but after the 
bids  had  been  concluded,  the  government  conducted  due  diligence  on  the 
winning company and found that it was not in a financial position to complete 
the investment. After some failed negotiations, the concession was re-opened 
for  bidding  in  2009  which  seems  to  have  led  to  some  strong  bids  that  are 
currently  being  evaluated  by  the  government.  Another  company  is  currently 
negotiating  with  the  government  about  the  development  of  untapped  iron 
reserves for which the company holds titles. The same company also holds titles 
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railroad from there via their Liberian reserves to port. However, the concession 
is  not  expected  to  lead  to  any  significant  investment  and  employment  for 
another three years. 
 
World market prices for iron ore are unlikely to reach their 2008 levels 
again anytime soon and so a historical window of opportunity for favourable 
concession agreements in iron mining has likely passed. However, iron mining 
investments  have  a  very  long  time  horizon  and  will  be  extremely important 
sources of revenue and – to a lesser extent – employment for decades to come. 
As  companies  begin  to  gear  up  and  if  remaining  concessions  proceed  as 
planned, employment in the sector at full capacity could reach approximately 
8,500  jobs  in  the  next  four  years.  Given  the  long  time  horizon  of  iron  ore 
investments and the fact that Liberia has been able to attract good offers from 
reputable companies even during the crisis, there does not seem to be a need to 
accept  unfavourable  terms  in  the  concession  agreements  simply  because  of 







Liberia  possesses  43  percent  of  the  upper  Guinea  forest  which  is 
distributed among 14 countries in West Africa from Senegal to Nigeria. The 
potential for timber production is substantial, although there are concerns over 
the need to preserve the forest’s biodiversity.  The timber sector’s contribution 
to conflict in the region led to the imposition of sanctions on it by the United 
Nation’s Security Council in 2003.  In addition, Executive Order #1 cancelled 
all  timber  concessions  and  contracts  in  2006.    The  government  has  lost 
approximately US$ 150 million in taxes since the sanctions and the sector is no 
longer  contributing  its  pre-war  US$  100  million  to  GDP,  including  wage 
payments of approximately US$ 20 million. This is significant for the overall 
economy, and the trade unions estimate that 23,000 jobs were lost as a result of 
the sector’s decline.  
 
Exports of timber from Liberia are currently very small, less than US$ 1 
million per year. Initial data from the Ministry of Commerce, which has not yet 
been confirmed by the statistical office, estimates exports in the first quarter of 
2009 to have been US$ 746,000. Most sources agree that there is currently no 
significant commercial logging activity except for a few very small concessions 
to local companies. Furthermore, no export licenses for timber, required under 
United Nations’ provisions, have been issued so far. While this information on 
logging activities might be outdated, one possible source for the exports from 
the sector could be a special type of wood used for carving that is exempt from 
the United Nations’ regulations. Another possibility is that the exports come 
from previously logged trees that were abandoned by former owners during the 
civil war.   Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  68
 
Figure 15 shows indicators of world market prices for timber exports. 
The world market price for timber, as reported by the World Bank’s Global 
Economic  Monitor,  appears  to  have  been  moderately  affected  by  the  crisis. 
Throughout 2008, the price was relatively stable around 150 percent of its 2000 
level. It declined slightly in early 2009 and is reported to have reverted back to 
145 per cent of its 2000 level in May 2009. It is projected to fall again during 
2010 to around 135 percent and then make a slow recovery.  
 
 
Figure  15.  Selected  indicators  of  world  market  price  for  Liberian  timber, 






































Unit value of EU imports from the world of timber types exported by Liberia before the embargo
(US$/ton, source: Eurostat)
World Market price for timber (index, 2000=100, source: Global Economic Monitor)




Given  that  Liberia  has  not  been  exporting  large  quantities  of  timber 
since the civil war, no unit values are available for its own exports. However, it 
is possible to analyse unit values for EU imports from all trading partners of 
timber classified in the same tariff line as the imports that were reported from 
Liberia before the embargo.  This indicator shows considerable fluctuation in 
2008 ranging from a minimum of US$537/ton to a maximum of US$746. It 
reaches a low in February/March 2009 at around US$520/ton which may well 
be attributable to the crisis. However, it is a relatively small decline compared to 
other commodities.  
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Employment issues 
 
It  is  estimated  that  7,000-8,000  people  are  currently  employed  in 
informal  chainsaw  logging,  supplying  the  domestic  market  with  wood  for 
construction. Formal activity in the timber sector is currently resuming after the 
end of the U.N. imposed embargo on tropical woods exports. However, stalled 
concessions in this sector are slowing expected employment growth.  
 
Pre-war loggers have not been able to pay a trade union estimation of 
more than US$ 20 million in salary arrears and severance to workers since 2003 
because  they  have  not  been  given  due  process  to  dispose  of  their  assets, 
including previous forestry concessions, to enable them settle claims on them by 
workers  and  banks.  Many  are  sceptical  about  the  proposed  carbon  credit 
alternative. The Timber Workers’ Union has been negotiating with government 
on  behalf  of  its  members  but  to  no  avail.  They  estimate  that  52  timber 
companies still owe about 19,420 employees. Some former workers indicated 
that any new investment could encounter protest actions if workers are not paid 




Three rounds of bidding for commercial logging concessions have been 
conducted, covering about 40 percent of the total area available for logging. The 
first one was in 2008 for 6 small concessions of around 5,000 hectares each. 
These are short term concession for 3 years that give the holder the right to clear 
the land that can then be used for farming or other purposes. These contracts are 
reserved exclusively for Liberian companies. The second round of concessions 
was for 3 pieces of land between 60,000 and 120,000 hectares for 25 years that 
give the holder the right to manage the  forest  and log  at a sustainable rate. 
Concession  below  100,000  hectare  require at  least  51%  Liberian  ownership, 
larger ones are also available for purely foreign investors. These concessions 
were  cleared  by  the  legislature  in  May  2009.  The  last  round  was  held  in 
February  2009  for  4  large  concessions  totalling  700,000  hectares  and  the 
resulting bids are currently under evaluation. 
 
The  Forestry  Development  Authority  is  generally  pleased  with  the 
results of the process up to date and is expecting the concessionaires to take up 
commercial logging shortly, regardless of the economic crisis. However, other 
sources interviewed were more sceptical about  the prospects for the logging 
sector. They point out that out of the 6 concessions in the first round, only three 
could be awarded, and in two of these cases the financial backers pulled out 
eventually, so only one of these concessions is actually moving ahead. For the 
second round, only one concessionaire is reported to be moving forward while 
the  other  two  are  held  back  by  financial  difficulties. In  the  third round,  the 
quality of the bidders is said to be very low.  
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The financial difficulties of concessionaires may have been aggravated 
by the current crisis, but the main problem is failure to attract companies that 
have the experience and financial capacity to carry out investments, and this 
does not seem to be a result of the crisis. There are a number of issues that are 
currently  deterring  investment  from  international  companies  that  need  to  be 
understood  more  clearly  and  resolved.  This  would  include  a  review  of  the 
pricing and sizing of concessions that in the past have been found too small to 
attract large international investors. Also, logging is a very sensitive sector in 
terms of an international corporation’s public image because of environmental 
issues and linkages to conflict and corruption in many countries. These concerns 
by international companies – whether they are justified with respect to Liberia 
or not – need to be addressed, which require considerable marketing efforts by 
the FDA. Available estimates of the employment potential of the sector range 
up to 9,000 jobs. This is less than half of the level of employment which had 
existed in the sector in the past.  
 
Lower global timber prices in response to the drop in global demand 
make it even more difficult for companies to start operations in a sector that is 
already unattractive to investors because of contract conditions and a new tax 
structure  which  investors  find  prohibitive.  The  pre-war  land  rental  fee  was 
US$0.50 per hectare, but this has been raised to US$1.00 per hectare, with bid 
premiums  ranging  between  US$2.00  to  US$4.00.  Recently  a  company  paid 
US$11.50  per  ha  for  18,000  ha  which  is  considered  to  be  quite  high. 
Furthermore, in addition to pre-war restrictions that limit logging activity to 4 
percent of the total concession area per year, there are new rules on harvesting 
practices  that  include  limitations  on  crossing  of  waterways  and  a  30-metre 
buffer zone around each waterway. There is a 10 percent stumpage tax and a 10 
percent tax on the (FOB) cost of log shipments. Many companies argue that 







There are currently about 10,000 artisanal gold miners in Liberia but no 
large-scale commercial gold mining. Unlike most other commodities, the price 
for  gold  has  not  been  significantly  affected  by  the  economic  crisis.  After 
reaching  a  high  of  $968/oz  in  March  2008,  it  dipped  slightly  to  $760  in 
November  2008  only  to  recover  steadily  during  the  following  month  and 
stabilizing above $900 again in Mar-May 2009. Even at its low point in March 
2008, it was still substantially above the average level for 2007 ($696). The long 
term outlook from Global Economic Monitor has the price decline slightly back 
to this level ($700) by 2015.  
 




All  current  employment  in  gold  mining  is  on  a  small  scale  artisanal 
basis.  There  are  some  reports  that  given  the  current  development  of  world 
market prices, more artisanal miners are moving away from diamonds and have 
started looking for gold instead. However, precise information on these small-




The MLME reports a strong decrease in the activity of companies doing 
exploration for all kinds of mining activities (including  gold, diamonds, and 
coal). A map provided by the geological department of MLME that shows all 
ongoing exploration activity lists 34 companies that are currently involved in 
different stages of exploration for gold, diamonds and other minerals. Most of 
these companies are reported to have scaled down operations or put them on 
hold. The primary barrier with respect to gold mining in Liberia is not decreased 
world  market  demand,  but  rather  difficulties  in  obtaining  finance  for  large 
mining operations in a risky environment.  
 
Two companies have already signed Mineral Development Agreements 
(MDAs) to mine gold. A United States/Liberian company has a total of four 
MDAs, three of which are still pending confirmation by the legislature. The 
company is currently undergoing substantial turmoil, but it is not clear that this 
can  be  attributed  solely  to  the  crisis.  Investment  in  gold  mining  had  been 
expected to begin generating some employment in about three years, but, given 
the current situation, this seems unlikely. The second company is still doing 
some additional exploration and is expected to start investing in actual mining 
in 2-3 years. The potential for employment creation linked to this investment is 
not clear.  
 
Despite  favourable  world  market  conditions,  the  prospects  for  large-
scale commercial gold mining in Liberia have been impacted by the economic 
crisis through the tightening of international credit availability for exploration 
and mining. While this is likely to be temporary, it will delay the generation of 
employment and substantial government revenue in this sector. A solution could 
be to try to attract more solvent large international companies into the sector. 
Small-scale  artisanal  gold  mining  activity,  which  is  important  in  terms  of 
employment, is – if anything – likely to increase at the expense of diamond 
mining. However, if the sector does expand, it is also important to recognise 
concerns over the health and safety of miners in the sector and any adverse 
effects on the environment. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  72
 
 
9.  The  impact  of  the  crisis  on 
households 
 
Layoffs, reductions in earnings and loss of benefits (including housing, 
medical and food supplements) have placed pressures on household resources 
and increased the risk of poverty. Private, informal safety nets – in which people 
depend  on  family  and  friends  for  support  –  are  financed  by  employment 
earnings. When these earnings decrease, the social safety net weakens. Some 
plantations  which  provide  housing  permit  upwards  to  8  dependents  for  one 
worker to live in the housing units. Therefore, if one person loses a job and is 
forced  out  of  company  housing,  nine  people  become  homeless  and  without 
income. Lower earnings have made it difficult for workers to cover their basic 
needs, including food. Many workers face considerable uncertainty as to how 
long their current employment situation will last, and this additional stress has 
been noted as a reason for workplace accidents and lower productivity. Some 
redundant  workers  with  disputed  and/or  unpaid  severance  benefits  or  salary 
arrears  have  the  added  burden  of  not  having  capital  to  establish  alternative 
livelihoods. 
 
The  worsening  conditions  for  informal  workers  and  small-scale 
businesses also have broader consequences. The closure of one market table, or 
the failure of a retail store, has serious negative implications for the family, 
especially women and their children. One key informant for the marketers noted 
that the enrolment in the schools for children of market women has fallen.   
 
The effect of the decline in the price of rice on the international and 
local market is positive for consumers. Although the price of a bag of rice has 
fallen, it is still not affordable by many. The widening parity gap between the 
US dollar and the Liberian dollar has led to increases in prices, expressed in 
Liberian  dollars,  of  many  consumer  goods  and  services.  Consequently,  the 
purchasing power of households has declined, leading to less money spent in the 
local economy on goods and services. 
 
    Due to higher rates, some customers are not paying their electricity bills, 
and the disconnection of these customers has commenced. This reduces access 
to electricity for the small minority of Liberians that currently have electrical 
services. The lack of running water is another major issue that will most likely 
continue  to  be  overlooked  during  these  difficult  economic  times,  stalling 
progress for a nation struggling to emerge from its post-conflict situation. The 
lack  of  access  to  these  basic  social  and  economic  services  contributes  to Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  73
economic and social insecurity. It will further limit the productivity of own-
account  workers  and  small-scale  enterprises.  For  these  reasons,  greater  and 
more  reliable  access  to  these  basic  services  should  remain  a  priority  for 
policymakers. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  74
 
10 Economic  Policy  Space  and 
Strategies 
  This report has documented the negative impacts of the global crisis on 
Liberia – with a specific focus on trade, foreign investment, and employment. 
We  now  turn  to  the  question  of  policy  responses,  beginning  with 
macroeconomic  and  other  broad-based  strategies.  Already  a  number  of 
countries  have  shifted  their  economic  policy  positions  so  as  to  attempt  to 
counteract  the  global  downturn.  Strategies  include  fiscal  stimulus  packages 
(through  spending,  taxation,  and  public  investment  policies)  and  emergency 
monetary responses (attempts to increase the liquidity of and restore confidence 
in global financial markets). As we have discussed, the channels through which 
the recession affects Liberia are different from the ways in which the crisis has 
manifested itself in higher income countries. Similarly, the policy response, and 
the available policy space, is also different for Liberia. In this section of the 
report, we explore these issues. 
 
  The policy areas explored in this section also are important in terms of 
longer-run  policy  objectives.  Macroeconomic  policies  directly  impact  the 
quality  and  quantity  of  employment  opportunities.  Macroeconomic  policies 
support demand in domestic markets and help to create a positive environment 
for investment. Through such channels, they raise the demand for labour and 
create new employment opportunities. In addition, macro-level policies affect 
returns to labour and therefore employment incomes and living standards. For 
example, exchange rate policies in Liberia can protect the terms of trade for 
self-employed individuals who purchase using U.S. dollars, but sell in markets 
using Liberian dollars. Public investment can be used to raise productivity and 
improve  market  access,  thereby  improving  earnings  potential.  Of  course, 
complementary policies are needed to insure that Liberians can take advantage 
of  the  improved  employment  opportunities  when  they  become  available  – 
through capacity building, education, and skills development. Nevertheless, the 
policy  areas  discussed  in  this  section  should  play  a  central  role  in  any 





  Liberia runs a cash-based budget in which total expenditures must not 
exceed  the  sum  of  current  revenues  and  any  accumulated  cash  reserves. 
Therefore,  there  is  no  scope  for  a  traditional  expansionary  fiscal  policy,  in 
which taxes are cut or spending increased and the resulting deficit is financed 
through government borrowing.  Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  75
 
The government has recently reduced corporate and personal income tax 
rates and has eliminated the import duty on rice. However, these measures do 
not represent a stimulus at the macroeconomic level, since government revenues 
will  be  correspondingly  lower  and,  given  the  cash-based  budget,  potential 
spending will be less. The net impact on the Liberian economy is uncertain. If 
households  and  companies  spend  the  additional  income  they  have  at  their 
disposal due to the tax breaks on domestically produced goods and services, it 
will increase demand in local markets. If the additional after-tax income is spent 
on  imports  or  saved,  the  impact  on  the  domestic  economy  will  be 
correspondingly less. In contrast, if the tax breaks were not implemented and 
the  additional  revenues  were  spent  by  government,  the  impact  would  be 
influenced by similar factors: the extent to which government has the capacity 
to  effectively  spend  the  additional  revenues  and  the  degree  to  which  the 
spending is concentrated on domestic economic activities. 
 
  Although the cash-based budget prevents Liberia from pursuing a broad-
based fiscal stimulus, it does not preclude using tax policy to stimulate targeted 
investment. For example, strategic tax reductions could be extended to priority 
sectors, as long as such policies are consistent with the revenue code. Such tax 
reductions could be directly linked to employment creation. Tax policies could 
be used to encourage companies to increase their workforces and provide jobs 
to Liberians, including vulnerable populations. 
 
  The current negotiations (and re-negotiations) of a number of concession 
agreements  raises  concerns  over  future  government  revenue  collection  and 
fiscal policy space. The rapid decline in commodity prices has resulted in a shift 
in bargaining power away from government and towards the bidders (less of a 
sellers market and more of a buyers market). This may affect the terms of the 
concession  –  for  example,  royalty  payments  and  other  streams  of  future 
government revenues from the agreements. In most cases, these negotiations 
will not have any immediate impact on current government revenues – with the 
possible exception of any once-off payments. However, current commitments 
will affect future revenue flows. One strategy that can be pursued is to index 
payments to government to the relevant global commodity price. When global 
prices recover,  government would not be locked into low rates agreed upon 
during this time of depressed commodity markets. 
 
  Liberia has reached the decision point in the HIPC debt relief process 
and  now  faces  a  floating  completion point.  There  are  a  number of  reforms, 
linked to the HIPC debt relief process, that could be prioritised in order to open 
up fiscal space in the near future by reducing the time it takes to reach the 
completion point. Most important of these is the passage of the Public Financial 
Management (PFM) legislation. This is already a government priority and the 
reform is expected to pass later this year. Typically, countries must have the 
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the HIPC completion point.
24 However, the Government of Liberia could make 
an appeal to move up the completion point. Such an appeal would be contingent 
on  the  passage  of  the  PFM  reforms.  Similarly,  revisions  to  the  country’s 




  Moving up  the  completion  point  would create  additional  fiscal  space 
through several channels. First, Liberia would receive some additional relief in 
terms of reducing the servicing costs on its external debt (much of the servicing 
costs of Liberia’s debt that would be affected by the HIPC process are already 
being covered
26). Second, the ability to access concessionary borrowing would 
be restored. Finally, reaching the completion point will send positive signals 
about the health of the economy to donors and potential investors. For these 
reasons, a concerted effort to accelerate the legislative changes need to reach the 





  One of the most significant factors limiting the revitalisation of Liberia’s 
economy is the lack of basic infrastructure – including critical areas of social 
infrastructure, such as the construction of schools and clinics. This is widely 
recognised.  Poor  infrastructure  lowers  productivity,  raises  costs,  and  limits 
competitiveness  on  global  markets.  This  reduces  foreign  and  domestic 
investment.  Lack  of  transportation,  electricity,  storage,  and  processing 
infrastructure is perhaps the single most important constraint for small-holder 
agricultural  producers.  Inadequate  school  facilities  compromises  public 
investments  in  education  and  limit  the  opportunities  which  Liberia’s  young 
population will be able to access in the future. Investments in the country’s 
human resources are a critical, if more intangible, type of infrastructure. 
 
Without  adequate  public  investment  in  these  areas,  economic 
development  will  be  seriously  compromised.  At  the  macroeconomic  level, 
public investment operates on both the demand and supply side of the economy. 
On the demand side, spending on infrastructure raises demand for inputs and 
creates jobs directly. On the supply side, new infrastructure raises productivity, 
encourages investment, and, through these channels, helps improve employment 




                                                 
24    Interview with IMF residential representative, July 20
th, 2009. 
25    One of the triggers for Liberia’s floating completion point is to implement a revised 
investment incentive code in which investment incentives could only be extended within the 
context of the country’s revenue code. 
26    IMF (2009). Liberia: Second Review under the Three-year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
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  Most  of  the  infrastructure  projects  currently  underway  in  Liberia  are 
supported through donor funds. However, there have been efforts to prioritise 
infrastructure provision by the Government of Liberia in the 2009/10 budget. 
For  example,  the  budget  of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  has  increased  to 
approximately $40 million for the 2009/10 fiscal year. About 80 percent of this 
budget is directed towards infrastructure projects.
27 This represents a significant 
increase over previous allocations. Nevertheless, infrastructure spending in the 
budget remains extremely small when compared to the overall need.   
 
  In  addressing  the  negative  consequences  of  the  global  crisis, 
infrastructure investment through expanded public works programmes represent 
a  strategy  with  both  short-run  and  long-run  benefits.  In  the  short-run,  such 
programmes  could  be  used  to  provide  employment  opportunities  to  those 
adversely affected by the crisis, particularly if labour-intensive infrastructure 
projects are adopted. Such programmes would leave behind public assets which 
would provide benefits to the private sector in the long run. Given the limited 
fiscal space – described above – such public investment programmes  would 
require donor support to help Liberia address the impacts of the crisis. Also – 
constraints in terms of capacity, procurement, and delivery would need to be 
addressed if such programmes were to be scaled up from their current levels. 
Nevertheless,  such  initiatives  represent  one  strategy  to  connect  short-terms 
responses to the crisis to the country’s long-term development goals.  
 
 
Monetary and exchange rate policies 
 
  Monetary policy in Liberia faces a number of constraints which limit its 
ability to counteract the effects of the crisis by stimulating economic activity. 
One of the main limitations of monetary policy is the highly dollarised nature of 
the economy. Many transactions are carried out in U.S. dollars, not Liberian 
dollars. The extent of dollarisation is substantial: financial assets and liabilities 
are often denominated in U.S. dollars (US$), the national budget is presented in 
US$, US$  are  used  for  many  routine  transactions,  and  prices are  frequently 
quoted in US$. Estimates suggest that U.S. dollars account for up to 90 percent 
of the money supply.
28 However, the Central Bank of Liberia’s monetary policy 
only  operates  on  the  supply  of  Liberian  dollars.  The  result  of  widespread 
dollarisation is significantly less control over monetary policy. 
 
  Dollarisation represents only one factor which limits the scope for an 
independent monetary policy in Liberia. The structure of the domestic financial 
sector  constrains  the  Central  Bank’s  use  of  traditional  monetary  policy 
instruments.  The domestic  banking  sector  is  highly  liquid  and  banks  hold  a 
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nd 2009. 
28    Eramus, Leichter, and Menkulasi, 2009. De-dollarisation in Liberia: lessons from cross-
country experience. WP/09/37. IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington 
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sizeable amount of excess reserves. Therefore,  efforts to stimulate economic 
activity by lowering the reserve requirement will have no impact – banks will 
continue to hold the same level of liquid assets. Similarly, banks have little 
incentive  to  borrow  from  the  central  bank  in  order  to  meet  their  reserve 
requirements,  since  they  are  already  highly  liquid.  There  is  no  functioning 
capital market in Liberia and, as a consequence, no ability to conduct monetary 
policy  through  the  purchase  and  sale  of  government  securities.  Instead,  the 
supply  of  Liberian  dollars  is  controlled  through  the  buying  and  selling  of 
foreign exchange (i.e. U.S. dollars). 
 
  Therefore, the conduct of monetary policy in Liberia is closely linked to 
exchange rate policy. The Central Bank manages the exchange rate by buying 
and  selling  Liberian  dollars.  Changes  in  the  exchange  rate  also  impact  the 
domestic  prices  of  goods  exchanged  in  Liberian  dollars.  Intervention  in  the 
foreign exchange market is the primary tool for influencing the exchange rate, 
the inflation rate, and the domestic money supply. This means that the monetary 
policy instruments which Liberia has at its disposal are extremely limited. 
 
  The  Central  Bank  has  recently  used  foreign  exchange  operations  to 
support  the  value  of  the  Liberian  dollar  when  the  exchange  rate  began  to 
depreciate  earlier  in  2009.
29  In  this  respect,  Liberian  monetary  policy  has 
responded to one consequence of the global economic crisis. By supporting the 
Liberian  dollar,  the  Central  Bank  helps  to  shield  individuals  who  use  the 
Liberian  dollar  for  routine  exchanges  from  the  adverse  impacts  of  the 
depreciation.  There  is  little  additional  scope  for  a  monetary  response  to  the 
crisis. In the future, if the banking sector extends more credit by reducing its 
holdings  of  liquid  assets,  if  demand  for  Liberian  dollars  increases,  and  if  a 
domestic  capital  market  is  developed,  the  scope  for  monetary  policy  will 
expand. Policies that support these institutional changes are desirable since they 
will expand the set of tools available to policy-makers. This transformation will 
not be realised in the short-term and therefore the role of monetary policy in 
responding to the immediate crisis is limited. 
 
Financial sector policies 
 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  Liberian  financial  sector  has  been  insulated 
from  the  negative  impacts  of  the  crisis.  In  fact,  the  financial  sector  has 
continued to grow and expand despite the turmoil in global markets and the 
worldwide  liquidity  crunch.  According  to  the  May  2009  Fact  Sheet  on  Key 
Economic and Financial Indicators, published by the Central Bank of Liberia, 
total deposits, both in Liberian and U.S. dollars, continue to grow.  The ratio of 
non-performing loans has declined, down to 15.4 percent of all loans in May 
2009.  The number of  banks has increased over the past few  years,  as new 
players enter the market. Currently, there are 8 banks operating in the country, 
with an additional bank expected in the near future. By many standards, the 
Liberian financial sector appears healthy and vibrant.  
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  Despite the apparent robustness of the banks, the financial sector plays a 
relatively limited role in supporting productive investment and employment in 
Liberia. Most of the credit extended by the banks is used to finance imports, not 
domestic  production.  Moreover,  the  banks  have  a  large  amount  of  excess 
liquidity  –  there  are significant  resources  in the  system  to  extend  additional 
credit. The liquidity ratio in the banking sector from May 2008 to April 2009 
was between 50 and 60 percent – compared to a required liquidity ratio of 15 
percent.
30 Despite the increasing numbers of banks, spreads between lending 
and deposit rates remain large. For example, according to Central Bank data for 
May 2009, the spread between average lending rates (14.2 percent) and average 
deposit rates on savings accounts (2.0 percent) was 12.1 percentage points.  
 
  There are many reasons for the excess liquidity and limited extension of 
credit in the banking system. The effective demand for loans is relatively small. 
In Liberia, the rate of non-performing loans has been high, and the capacity to 
manage credit is frequently limited, particularly among small-scale borrowers. 
A lack of sustained information on creditworthiness causes banks to be cautious 
and to focus lending on core clientele. Collateral requirements are often very 
high in order to protect the banks, but this limits the pool of potential borrowers. 
Moreover, demand for loans denominated in Liberian dollars remains limited. 
The  negative  impact  of  the  financial  crisis  on  the  domestic  economy  also 
reduces  the  effective  demand  for  credit  to  support  investment  in  productive 
activities. 
 
  Despite these significant constraints, the fact remains that the financial 
sector in Liberia has a significant pool of resources which could be much more 
efficiently utilised. Given the scarcity of resources elsewhere in the economy, 
finding ways of mobilizing these resources to support employment creation and 
other development objectives represents an important opportunity.  
 
  There  are  already  plans  to  establish  a  credit  registry  and  reference 
system in order to improve the quality of information that banks have at their 
disposal. If such a credit registry were broad-based and included a history of 
microfinance loans, this could help reduce one of the barriers to small-scale 
lending. Financial sector reforms along these lines should not be based on the 
proliferation  of  microfinance  institutions  and  other  alternative  finance 
institutions.  An  integrated  approach  that  connects  commercial  banks, 
government  programmes,  formal  regulations,  and  institutional  changes  for 
administering  small-scale  loans  is  required.  Government  programmes  should 
support efforts by formal financial institutions to extend credit to productive 
activities. For example, complementary capacity building programmes can be 
paired with small-scale loans administered through explicit linkages with larger 
scale financial institutions. In addition, government programmes could provide 
loan  guarantees  to  small  scale  enterprises  and  cooperatives  that  have  gone 
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through  a  formal  training  programme  and  have  demonstrated  a  capacity  to 
successfully manage credit. Such guarantees reduce a portion of the risks which 
banks face when making loans and would encourage greater credit extension 
and narrower spreads.  
 
  Changes in lending practices can also  eliminate the barriers to credit 
access.  For  example,  one  Liberian  bank  has  successfully  experimented  with 
innovative microcredit schemes in which credit is extended to groups in up-
country  communities.  The  bank  first  identifies  groups  and  associations  with 
which  it  can  work.  These  groups  and  associations  include  informal  traders, 
church groups, and small scale savings and credit cooperatives. It then works 
with these groups to formalise financial services. The groups open a collective 
savings account and this account serves as collateral for making loans. All the 
members  of  the  group  have  a  stake  in  ensuring  that  any  loan  is  re-paid, 
providing an effective mutual monitoring system. The challenge is to scale up 
such initiatives to support widespread access to financial services. 
 
  The lack of credit supporting agricultural activities has been identified 
by the Ministry of Agriculture as a critical issue that needs to be addressed.
31 
The  Agricultural  Cooperative  Development  Bank  (ACDB),  when  it  existed, 
provided credit  to  agricultural activities,  but  did  not  serve  smallholders.
32  A 
strong case can be made to revitalise development finance in Liberia, and to 
extend such services to the agricultural sector. Sustainable approaches can build 
on what already exists and could involve establishing agricultural microfinance 
institutions, forging linkages between formal banks and informal savings and 
credit organisations in rural areas, and developing public-private partnerships to 
reduce  barriers  to  extending  financial  services  to  under-served  areas  and 
activities.  
 
  These strategies for removing the barriers to accessing credit can support 
a broader employment strategy. Small enterprises are a significant source of 
employment  creation  in  Liberia.  Moreover,  in  terms  of  sheer  numbers, 
smallholder agriculture and non-agricultural self-employment represents the two 
most important sources of employment in the country. In addition, support for 
these activities can support broader objectives, such as food-security (in the case 
of  smallholder  rice  production)  and  diversification  of  economic  activities. 
Often,  lack  of  access  to  capital  limits  productivity  and  earnings  in  these 
enterprises and activities. However, access to credit represents only one – and 
perhaps not the most important – constraint to improving these employment 
opportunities. Therefore, an integrated policy approach, which includes training 
and  skills  development,  to  assist  small-scale  enterprises  and  to  improve  the 
quality of self-employment will be needed.      
                                                 
31    Ministry of Agriculture. 2006. From Subsistence to Sufficiency: Food and Agriculture 
Policy and Strategy. Monrovia. 
32    The Agricultural Cooperative Development Bank was not sustainable, due to large scale 
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11. Labour  market  institutions, 
employment  programmes,  and 
social dialogue 
 
Emergency employment policies and programmes 
 
The  Ministry  of  Labour  is  currently  engaged  in  a  number  of  critical 
initiatives,  including  the  development  of  the  National  Employment  Policy 
(NEP), the  creation  of  a  new  National  Bureau of  Employment,  and  moving 
forward with the revision of Liberia’s labour law – the draft Decent Work Bill. 
These  institutions  and  policies  will  be  necessary  for  realizing  the  long-term 
goals of generating decent, productive employment opportunities as part of the 
country’s economic revitalisation. However, the global crisis has hit Liberia at a 
time when these initiatives have not been completed and they cannot be relied 
upon to address the impacts of the crisis in the short-run. Nevertheless, there are 
a number of programmes that are already in place that do have the potential to 
address some of the adverse effects of the crisis on Liberia. 
 
An  employment  strategy  that  encourages  short-term  employment  is 
needed,  and  some  initial  work  was  done,  until  2008,  through  LEEP  which 
focused on labour-intensive road reconstruction and private sector development 
of  waste  management.  This  is  one  programme  of  many  which  created 
emergency jobs. The challenge is that the efforts are disbursed across many 
sectors, and the impact of emergency job creation is therefore dissipated and 
requires coordination, consolidation, and clear leadership. The potential of this 
is described in the new National Bureau of Employment (NBE), defined in the 
draft National Employment Policy. The NBE will be a semi-autonomous body 
within the Ministry of Labour, reporting directly to the Minister.  
 
With the global financial crisis, there will be increased demand for short 
term income generation and emergency employment programs at a time when 
securing funding for emergency employment may become more difficult. Also, 
the impact of the economic crisis appears to be uneven across sectors, regions, 
and types of employment. Ensuring equitable access to emergency employment 
programs will require an assessment of the added need created by the crisis and 
potential adjustments to how the programmes have been targeted. In addition, 
the  crisis  will  place  additional  demands  on  the  capacity  of  the  Ministry  of 
Labour  and  providers  of  technical  support  (e.g.  the  ILO),  if  the  emergency 
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impacts of the crisis. Donors and international agencies will need to provide 
increased financial and technical support to the new NBE.   
 
 
Dispute resolution and social dialogue 
 
The  global  crisis  in  Liberia  has  already  led  to  a  number  of  serious 
industrial disputes, and these conflicts could grow in the near future if the crisis 
continues.  Labour  inspectors,  tripartite  bodies,  human  resource  managers, 
appointed conciliators and arbitrators, as well as Ministry staff will feel added 
pressures to prevent and resolve disputes quickly. Many of these disputes will 
probably be about payment and redundancy benefits.  
 
To mitigate these crisis effects on disputes, increased focus will need to 
be put on encouraging social dialogue at national, regional, sector and enterprise 
levels. In practical terms, this means: setting up social dialogue bodies in key 
sectors, making mediation training and knowledge of labour rights more widely 
available,  and  making  better  transport  (such  as  motorbikes)  and 
communications  facilities  (mobile phones  and  email)  available  to inspectors, 
conciliators and the social partners.  
 
Progress  has  been  made  in  strengthening  social  dialogue  with  the 
founding of the National Tripartite Council (NTC). More specifically, under the 
Decent  Work  Bill  (yet  to  be  enacted),  the  NTC  will  advise  and  make 
recommendations to the Minister on labour issues, participate in the process of 
developing codes of conduct and regulations under the Decent Work Bill, and 
recommend appointments to the Minimum Wage Board. The NTC will identify 
conciliators to assist with industrial disputes that the President considers to be in 
the national interest, and will be able to perform other functions as required by 
the Minister.  
 
The  financial  crisis  will  create  more  pressure  for  consultation, 
recommendation  and  intervention.  There  will  be  risks  of  growing  mistrust 
between  the  social  partners  and  conflicts  over  the  distribution  of  national 
income  as  economic  growth  slows  down.  There  will  greater  potential  for 
restructuring  of  enterprises,  worker  redundancy  and  business  failures.  Most 
workers  are  not  represented  through  the  classic social  dialogue  structures  in 
place  or  envisaged  because  they  are  part  of  the  informal  sector  or  are  self-
employed contract workers. In times of crisis, their voices need to be heard. 
 
Although Liberia has made a good start in improving its institutions of 
social  dialogue,  more  work  is  needed.  The  capacity  of  the  NTC  should  be 
strengthened  to  maximise  its  full  potential  to  promote  and  sustain  social 
dialogue. In addition, there is a need to instill transparency and trust between the 
social  partners  and  the  government.  Increased  attention  should  be  paid  to 
encouraging social dialogue at national, regional, sector and enterprise levels. 
This  requires  the  establishment  of  social  dialogue  bodies  in  key  sectors, Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  84
widespread information and training on labour law and dispute resolution, and 
the provision of appropriate facilities available to inspectors, conciliators and 





The main impacts of the economic crisis on labour inspection are: (1) an 
increase in the number of vulnerable workers; (2) more industrial disputes over 
redundancy issues; and (3) more resistance of cash-strapped employers in terms 
of complying with labour standards due to the perceived costs of doing so.  
 
Liberia  currently  has  fewer  than  50  labour  inspectors  to  promote 
compliance with the labour law in a workforce of more than one million people. 
Inspection  is  difficult  because  the  workforce  is  dispersed  and  highly 
informalised. Although labour inspection is geared to standard, formal sector 
jobs, four-fifths of those employed work either in agricultural self-employment 
or in informal non-agricultural sectors. Labour inspectors are low paid (about 
$70 per month), poorly educated (none are graduates) and poorly trained (no 
more than a few days each).  
 
Given  the  economic  crisis  and  the  current  constraints  in  government 
resources, there are a number of strategic responses which should be pursued. 
Inspection should target sectors and enterprises where advice on compliance 
and dispute resolution is most needed – these are likely to be the sectors most 
impacted  by  the  crisis.  Inspection  should  be  geared  to  practical  advice  and 
encouragement improvements, rather than pursuing punishment, as a first step. 
Finally, inspectors should cultivate a willingness to engage with workers in the 
informal economy where compliance may be less important than an ability to 
help facilitate practical improvements.   
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12. Policy responses and strategies 
for addressing the crisis 
In the course of the rapid assessment, numerous policies and initiatives 
were identified which would contribute to improved employment opportunities 
in Liberia and contribute to the LPRS goals of reducing poverty and revitalizing 
the  economy.  In  the  course  of  the  assessment,  the  workers  and  employers 
interviewed offered their own policy suggestions and priorities – many of which 
correspond to the recommendations which we will discuss in detail below. A list 
of these policy suggestions has been included in the appendix.  
 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  not  all  of  these  strategies  could  be 
implemented in the short-run and therefore may  not be able to respond fast 
enough  to  address  the  global  crisis.  Liberia  still  faces  formidable  long-run 
challenges in rebuilding the country, re-establishing institutions, improving the 
skills and education of the population, and shifting the country onto an equitable 
and inclusive development path. The global crisis has added to this challenge 
and raised the question of which short-run responses are currently needed in the 
context of the longer-term development priorities.  Therefore, we discuss short-
run crisis responses separately from longer-term strategies. 
 
 
Short-term responses to the crisis 
 
  A  number  of  short-term  strategies  emerged  during  the  course  of  the 
assessment that could be used to respond to the adverse impacts of the crisis. 
These  responses  are  not  new  and  many  reflect  current  policy  priories. 
Nevertheless, they can be pulled together into a unified response to the crisis.  
 
Reassess the priorities of the Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy in light of new 
resource  constraints  and  challenges.  The  crisis  will  adversely  impacted  the 
planned realisation of the targets and objectives of the LPRS which covers the 
period 2008-2011. The crisis has placed pressures on government spending, the 
collapse of demand in key global markets has compromised efforts to revitalise 
the  economy,  and  employment  has  suffered  with  important  implications  for 
poverty reduction and social stability. Fortunately, development assistance is 
expected to remain relatively stable in the face of the crisis. Nevertheless, there 
is a need to revisit and more strictly prioritise areas of delivery within the LPRS 
in order to make the most of the resources which are available. This report has 
argued that improving opportunities for decent work should remain a critical 
priority. 
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Extend emergency employment programmes to those adversely affected by the 
crisis.  As  discussed  in  the  report,  numerous  emergency  employment 
programmes  are  already  operating  in  Liberia.  With  sufficient  donor  and 
technical support, these programmes can be scaled up to create jobs for workers 
displace by the  global crisis. Examples have been given in the report. Such 
programmes  should  be  linked  to  investments  in  infrastructure,  including  the 
labour-intensive construction of schools and roads. 
 
Continue to prioritise the attainment of the HIPC completion point. Reaching 
the completion point would help relax Liberia’s fiscal resource constraint by 
providing  some  additional  relief  in  terms  of  debt  servicing  payments  and 
opening up the possibility for concessional borrowing. A prerequisite for the 
completion  point  is  the  passage  of  the  public  finance  management  (PFM) 
reforms. Once this legislation has been adopted, Liberia could request that the 
completion point be moved up. 
 
Provide  support  to  smallholders  for  diversification  and  investment.  As  this 
report  has  documented,  the  economic  crisis  has  hurt  smallholders  in  sectors 
such as rubber and palm oil. The squeeze has come at a time when replanting is 
critical to ensure future productivity. Programmes to support investments in new 
tree  crops  can  help  prevent  the  downturn  from  undermining  the  economic 
viability of these growers in the future. Provisions in concession agreements 
which provide support to outgrowers for replanting should be protected. The 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  has  worked  together  with  donors  to  help  rubber 
smallholders diversify into cocoa. With financial and technical support, such 
programmes could be expanded in response to the crisis. 
 
Ensure  that  on-going  concession  negotiations  do  not  lock  government  into 
unfavourable  terms.  The  period  covered  by  the  concession  agreements  will 
exceed the expected duration of the global crisis. Any deterioration in Liberia’s 
bargaining position is likely to be temporary. Therefore, it is important to ensure 
that  short-term  responses  to  the  crisis  do  not  have  long-run  negative 
consequences for Liberia’s development trajectory. In some cases, exporting is 
not even  going  to  commence  within  the  expected  duration  of  the  crisis  and 
companies are simply using the crisis as a bargaining chips to get a better deal. 
The government will be well advised to resist such pressures and rather risk 
delays  or  re-opening  of bids.  The  planned  National  Investment  Law  will be 
useful to  give  the  government  a  stronger  stance  against  pressure  for  ad  hoc 
benefits to companies. If unavoidable, explicitly linking temporary benefits (e.g. 
reduced royalty payments) to global commodity prices represents one strategy 
for making sure that the any crisis related benefits to concession holders are 
temporary. Leniency can be granted to concession holders while global markets 
are depressed, but then removed once they have recovered. In this way, during 
boom periods, government’s share of the country’s natural resource rents would 
rise. 
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Mobilise the resources of the private financial sector to improve employment 
opportunities. The domestic banking sector has the capacity to extend additional 
credit which could support productive investments in Liberia. Already, several 
domestic  banks  have  created  microfinance  programmes.  These  could  be 
expanded  within  a  coherent  framework  for  financial  sector  reform,  with 
government  support.  Informal  and  small-scale  enterprises  face  multiple 
constraints in Liberia, and providing credit without addressing these other needs 
will have a limited impact. There is a need for a coordinated approach which 
pulls together small loans, capacity building, and market facilitation. Formation 
of  cooperatives  is  another  complementary  strategy  in  which  savings  can  be 
pooled and business activities made  more viable. Not all enterprises will be 
prepared  to  take  advantage  of  micro-  and  small-scale  loan  programmes. 
However,  for  those  who  are  ready,  such  initiatives  could  help  address  the 
negative impacts of the crisis on small-scale enterprises, the vulnerable self-
employed, and smallholder agricultural producers. 
 
Use social dialogue institutions and processes to resolve conflicts and disputes 
arising from the crisis. As has been noted, the potential for increased industrial 
disputes and conflicts linked, at least in part, to the crisis is significant. Such 
conflicts can be costly in economic, social, and human terms, and processes of 
social dialogue can reduce these costs. In anticipation of these growing tensions, 
government, along with the social partners, should be prepared to set up, as well 
as to strengthen existing, social dialogue bodies where they are needed and to 
make effective mediation services available. 
 
The Central Bank of Liberia should continue to stabilise the nominal exchange 
rate as needed. The report’s analysis has suggested that a depreciating exchange 
rate may hurt low-income households, small businesses, and those in informal 
employment. The Central Bank can help prevent a rapid depreciation of the 
Liberian dollar by intervening in foreign exchange markets. To the extent that 
resources  allow,  the  Central  Bank  should  pursue  policies  that  support  the 
currency in order to minimise the negative impact. Given the high levels of 
dollarisation  among  larger  firms  and  in  international  markets,  a  stronger 
Liberian dollar should not compromise the country’s export performance. 
 
 
Implications for a national employment strategy: longer-term policies 
 
  The overarching goal of this assessment is to shed light on the impacts 
the global economic crisis has had on Liberia and to suggest viable, short-term 
responses.  In  pursuing  this  objective,  numerous  issues  emerged  from  our 
interviews and investigations, all of which affect Liberia’s ability to generate 
decent, productive employment, but very few of which have simple, short-term 
solutions. Many of these issues are reflected in policy documents, such as the 
Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy and the draft National Employment Policy. 
The overlap between employment policies and national development strategies 
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far-reaching consequences for sustainable poverty reduction and the well-being 
of the entire population. 
 
  It is beyond the scope of the current report to outline a comprehensive 
framework for long-term sustainable employment in Liberia. However, in this 
concluding section, it is worth highlighting selected issues which came up in the 
course of the assessment.  
 
There is a need for the National Employment Policy and a potentially strong 
role for the National Bureau of Employment. A national policy framework for 
creating decent jobs and supporting livelihoods is essential if Liberia is to lay 
the  foundations  for  equitable  and  shared  growth.  Ensuring  that  the  National 
Employment  Policy  is  a  comprehensive  and  visionary  document  with  broad 
ownership is a good investment. The priorities identified in the Employment 
Policy  should  also  be  reflected  in  future  revisions  of  the  Liberia  Poverty 
Reduction  Strategy  to  secure  the  centrality  of  employment  in  the  nation’s 
development  strategy.  Strong  institutions  are  needed  to  implement  such  a 
policy.  The  creation  of  the  National  Bureau  of  Employment  represents  an 
important  step  in  this  direction.  With  appropriate  financial,  technical,  and 
political support, the National Bureau of Employment can coordinate efforts to 
improve employment opportunities across Ministries and to implement active 
labour market policies to facilitate equitable access to employment. 
 
Revitalise  rice  production,  including  among  smallholders.  Rice  is  a  critical 
commodity for Liberia. It is the staple food crop. It has important implications 
for  social  and  political  stability.  And  it  has  an  enormous  potential  for 
employment  creation.  However,  there  are  currently  significant  barriers  to 
revitalizing rice production in the country – including land tenure issues, lack of 
transportation, storage, and milling infrastructure, access to inputs, and limited 
technical  know-how.  In  the  course  of  this  assessment,  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture recommended that several pilot projects be launched to improve the 
viability of smallholder rice cultivation in targeted communities. This would 
require solutions to the land tenure issues, commitments of public investment in 
infrastructure, targeted extension services, and, at least initially, provision of 
key  inputs.  If  successful,  the  pilots  could  serve  as  a  model  that  could  be 
replicated  in  other  communities  in  the  country.  Such  initiatives  could  be 
pursued  along  with  larger  scale  rice  production  –  ideally  using  less  capital 
intensive production techniques than those currently in operation. Cooperative 
arrangements between large producers and smallholders would help guarantee a 
market for the output of small-scale operations. 
 
Create  a  development  finance  system  for  Liberia.  As  this  report  has  noted, 
Liberia’s financial sector is getting back on its feet and it has a central role to 
play  in  the  country’s  future.    A  developmental  financial  system  channels 
resources to productive uses and facilitates the management of risks associated 
with the process of development. There is a need to create a financial system in 
Liberia which supports the country’s growth and development goals. As this 
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role  in  this  regard,  with  appropriate  safeguards  in  place  and  targeted 
government  support.  Formal  commercial  banks  represent  only  one  type  of 
financial institution. Informal financial institutions – such as small scale savings 
and credit collectives and susu collectors – often provide basic financial services 
to those without access to formal banks. Credit to small scale producers could 
be  scaled-up,  if  a  comprehensive  framework  for  coordinating  microcredit 
activities is established. However, development finance is not limited to small-
scale and micro-credit. Development banks, specialised public institutions that 
have been capitalised by government, have played an instrumental role in the 
industrial development of many countries by mobilizing large-scale financing 
for investment. In the long-term, Liberia could move towards a development 
finance system which links commercial banks, micro-finance, small scale credit 
unions, and specialised development banks. The components of such a system 
could be built step-by-step, beginning with what currently exists. Such a system 
would play an instrumental role in creating new employment opportunities and 
diversifying the economy. 
 
Develop a national strategy for informal employment. Informal employment is 
one of the largest categories of employment in Liberia. A comprehensive and 
integrated strategy is needed to improve the earnings, productivity and working 
conditions  of  those  employed  in  informal  activities.  This  would  involve  the 
‘formalisation’ of informal employment, in the sense that strategies to support 
these workers and their livelihood strategies would be developed, and, in turn, 
those in informal employment would be expected to contribute to government 
tax revenues at an equitable rate.  Such strategies require an integrated approach 
involving  training,  finance,  technical  support  to  enterprises,  targeted  public 
investments,  improved  labour  force  information,  and  regulatory  changes  to 
support  the  growth  of  SMEs.  Coordination  across  various  Ministries  (e.g. 
Commerce, Labour, Finance, Agriculture, Gender, Youth, and Planning) would 
be needed to create an integrated approach to addressing informal employment. 
 
Natural resource exports and public investment. Liberia will depend on natural 
resource  exports  to  fuel  its  economy  for  many  years  into  the  future.  Many 
countries that depend on natural resource exports experience a ‘resource curse’ 
(sometimes  called  the  ‘Dutch  disease’)  with  lower  rates  of  growth,  an 
overvalued  exchange  rate  that  undermines  competitiveness  in  non-resource 
exports, and slower improvements in average living standards. However, not all 
resource rich countries experience these problems to the same degree.
33 There is 
no  simple  relationship  between  natural  resource  exports  and  economic 
outcomes. Policy choices matter – if Liberia makes the right policy choices, it 
can turn a potential natural resource curse into a natural resource opportunity. If 
the resources from commodity exports are used to fund strategic investments, 
instead of simply raising consumption spending, the risk of a resource curse will 
                                                 
33    Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz (2007). ‘Introduction: What is 
the problem with natural resource wealth?’ In M. Humphreys, J.D. Sachs, and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. 
Escaping the Resource Curse, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-20. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  91
be  minimised.
34  For  example,  natural  resource  revenues  and  concession 
agreements  can  be  used  to  supply  infrastructure  investments  that  improve 
productivity  and  employment  opportunities.  A  national  policy  for  the 
development of the country’s natural resources would provide a framework for 
ensuring  that  an  adequate  share  of  the  income  from  Liberia’s  rich  resource 
endowments is re-invested in the domestic economy. 
                                                 
34    Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2007). ‘How to handle the macroeconomics of oil wealth,’ In M. 
Humphreys, J.D. Sachs, and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. Escaping the Resource Curse, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 173-93. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  92
 
13. Concluding remarks 
 
  This rapid impact assessment of the global economic crisis in Liberia 
has documented the significant negative effects that the downturn has had on 
employment,  the  Liberian  economy,  and  the  well-being  of  the  population. 
Numbers of jobs lost do not capture the full impact: the quality of employment 
has also suffered, with more people working in marginalised and precarious 
activities. Conditions among informal workers and smallholders appear to have 
worsened  significantly  –  in these  cases,  the  negative  effects  on employment 
manifest themselves in terms of lower and more unpredictable earnings, one of 
the hidden outcomes of the crisis. These changes have almost certainly resulted 
in an expansion in the number of working poor, since one job often supports a 
number of dependents. Therefore the crisis reinforces the cycle of long working 
hours,  low  pay,  and  low  productivity  that  helps  explain  the  persistence  of 
poverty. 
 
Perhaps the greater risk stemming from the crisis is that future jobs will 
not  be  created  because  of  delayed  investments,  unfavourable  concession 
negotiations, or the long-term consequences of short-term decisions made in the 
context of the immediate crisis. It is crucial that the government maintains a 
long term perspective with respect to its economic strategies that focuses on 
future employment creation and resources for development. 
 
At first glance, Liberia may appear to have little policy space to respond 
to these challenges. However, as we have tried to underscore in this report, there 
are  a  number  of  strategies  which  could  be  pursued,  and  these  should  be 
considered for prioritisation within the LPRS framework. They could build on 
recent initiatives and points of strength. These can be combined with longer-
term policies to improve employment opportunities as the single best strategy 
for  reducing  poverty  and  raising  living  standards.  The  Poverty  Reduction 
Strategy  and  the  National  Employment  Policy  provide  two  complementary 
blueprints for moving forward. The challenge of inclusive growth and equitable 
development in Liberia is very much a challenge of creating decent work for all. 
It  will  take  years  to  get  there,  but  developing  an  appropriate  employment-
centred response to the current crisis represents a concrete step towards this 
ultimate goal. Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  93Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  94
APPENDIX 
 
Part A. List of consultations, meetings, and interviews. 
Government of Liberia 
Central Bank of Liberia 
Forest Development Authority 
Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-information Services 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Land, Mines, and Industry 
Ministry of Public Works 










International Agricultural Consultants and Suppliers 
International Aluminum  
Liberian Business Association 
Liberian Chamber of Commerce 
Liberian Bank for Development & Investment 
Liberian Electricity Company 
Liberia Marketing Association 
Liberia Wood Management Company 
Mittal Steel 
Sethi Brothers, Inc. 
Workers, trade unions, and labour organisations 
Arcelor Mittal Steel - former and current workers 
Buchanan Renewables-current workers 
Dock Workers Union of Liberia-current and former workers 
Firestone Agriculture Workers Union-current and former workers 
Former workers in the Timber sector 
Guthrie Plantation –current workers 
Liberian Agricultural Workers Union-current workers 
Liberian Electricity Company-current workers 
Liberian Labour Congress 
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Other organisations and institutions 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 
Embassy of the United States of America 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
International Monetary Fund 
International Rescue Committee 
Sirleaf Market Fund 
Stakeholder Working Group on Tree Crops 
Sustainable Tree Crop Program 
United Nations Development Program 
United Nations Mission in Liberia 
World Bank 
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Part B. Guiding interview questions for enterprises/employers. 
1.  COMPANY INFORMATION      
Name and title of respondant(s) 
 





Main activity (sector): 
 
For your three most important products and total sales, please indicate: 
Exports to Africa  Exports to the EU  Exports to the US   
 
Current employment structure: 
 
 
2.  IMPACT ON GENERAL BUSINESS SITUATION 
 
A.   How would you rate the adverse impact of the financial crisis on the business situation  
                                                                High         Moderate        Low           
No adverse impact 
i.  In Your Enterprise                                                                 
ii.  In the Country                                                                        
iii.  In Your sector of Activity                                                       
iv.  In Your Market Overseas                                                     
       (if applicable) Liberia Crisis Assessment, 2009  97
 
B.   Looking ahead at the next six months, what do you expect the business situation will be 
        Better    Same                  Worse 
i.     In Your Enterprise                             
ii.     In the Country                              
iii.   In Your sector of Activity                                    




C.      Through which channels has your company been affected by the crisis and how would 
you rate them according to their severity? 
  Rank 
Reduced access to finance from banks 
Reduced access to finance from parent company 
Reduced access to finance from other sources (pls. specify:                                       ) 
Reduced domestic prices 
Reduced domestic demand 
Reduced domestic product prices 
Reduced world market demand 
Reduced world market product prices 
Other(pls. specify:                                                                                                     )     




D.   If you are part of an international parent company, have operations in Liberia been hit more 
or less severely than overall operations? Please explain.  
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3.  TRENDS IN KEY VARIABLES 
 
A. How do you expect the following variables in your enterprise to change in the next six months 
as a result of the financial crisis? 
  Expected  % 
change 
i.  Volume of demand/business activity    
ii.  Employment   
iii. Average selling price(s) of your product(s) and/or service(s)    
iv. Investment   
v.  Expenditure on training   
vi. Profit   
vii. Exports (If Applicable)   
 
B. What has been your average capacity of utilisation over the year 2008 and what you expect it 
to be in 2009? (Capacity of utilisation is the actual output produced relative to the maximum 
output possible using all the available factors of production. Please provide your answer as a 
percentage of the maximum output possible e.g. if output is at full capacity then level of capacity 
utilisation is 100%.)   
 
  Current  2009 
Level of Capacity Utilisation                         %                        % 
 
 
4.  ACTIONS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS 
 
A.  How many workers have you laid off so far because of the crisis? How many additional workers are you planning 
to lay off currently, or if the current situation persists? 
 
Currently planning to 
lay off 
Lay off if current situation persists for another 3 
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persists 1 year 
i.   Adjusting hours of work (e.g. reducing overtime & no. of shifts)     
ii.   Reorganising work systems and functions to improve efficiency     
iii.   Redundancies/downsizing     
iv.   Delaying recruitments     
v.   Encouraging early retirement, voluntary/negotiated departures,  
leaves without pay 
   
vi.   Exercising non-replacement of departing staff     
vii.   Postponing investment plans     
viii.   Sale of assets     
ix.   Outsourcing of activities     
x.   Wage freeze/deferring wage increases     
xi.   Wage moderation     
xii.   Reduction in pay packets for working lesser hours     
xiii.   Consultation with workers and/or unions to renegotiate labour contracts      
xiv.    Streamlining and better monitoring of expenses to cut costs     
xv.    Reducing management salaries and/or bonuses     
xvi.   Filling work gaps with training     
xvii.   Debt restructuring     
xviii. Seek financial assistance     
xix. Increased marketing/promotional efforts     
xx. Shut down operations in Liberia     
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C.  What measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis on your economy and enterprises has the 
government undertaken so far? Has your company benefited from these measures and have you 
been satisfied with them?  
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
 __                       
 
                         
 
D. Do you require direct assistance from your government? If yes, please indicate what sort of 
assistance would enable your company to survive the current environment? 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
E. What interventions would assist in ameliorating the impact of the crisis on your economy? 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
   
F. What programmes should your government embark on to prepare your country for future 
crisis? 
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4.  GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
Any General Comments 
 
                         
 
                         
 
                         
 
 
Thank you for participating in this Survey 
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Part C. Priority themes of the workers inquiry. 
 
For all workers discussions we need to have heading to capture relevant information such as: 
 
Employer or former employer 
Skilled –unskilled labour at site 
Employment status for most (wage and salary, own account)  
Age group and gender of workers (general or if statistics can be provided) 
Trade union affiliation 
County name   
District name   
Clan/township   
Name of city/town/village   
Whether Urban or Rural 
 
What type of disruption has been seen in the workplace? 
 
What impacts of the crisis have been felt:  e.g. wage reductions, working hour reduction, layoffs, 
doing more with less? 
 
Does everyone know why they were released-what information provided to them? 
 
Did you look for work during the last 30 days and what action did you take to seek work? If not, 
why did you not look for work?  
 
Will you:  
Go back to home village 
Migrate to city to find job 
Migrate to neighbouring countries to find job 
Run your own business 
Acquire new skills (through training/education) 
 
Among workers released are men or women likely to find a new job-or migrate? 
 
Did you get any support form employer, government, community groups and family, church 
groups? 
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Part D. Policy suggestions and priorities identified in the interviews. 
 
During the interviews respondents were asked to suggest recommendations on how the 
government could help to stimulate employment growth. Some common themes mentioned were 
to:  
 
￿  Reduce taxes during difficult times; 
￿  Develop initiatives to promote and support business diversification and small and 
medium Liberian enterprises; 
￿  Examine the dual currency issue and initiate measures to strengthen parity; and 
￿  Improve social and physical infrastructure.  
 
 
More sector specific suggestions included government intervention to mediate disputes between 
workers and employers, especially concerning back pay for rubber and timber workers and 
honouring terms of collective bargaining agreements. Others suggestions include:  
 
￿  Link laid off workers’ severance payments into alternative livelihood schemes with 
micro-loan institutions. 
￿  Encourage more large investments through attractive investment incentives 
￿  The royalty, import duty and tax structure should be harmonised to create a more level 
playing field. 
￿  Prioritise partially mechanised commercial lowland rice production in which Liberia has 
a comparative advantage, using appropriate technology machines (e.g., power tillers and 
threshers) to improve labour productivity. 
￿  Liberians should be educated learn to diversify their diet instead of depending solely on 
rice through the teaching of nutrition in schools. 
￿  A stabilisation fund for rice should be established by imposing US$1 on each bag to 
stabilise the price when there is upward pressure on rice prices. 
￿  Fast track the Land Commission Act to reduce land tenure barriers to local rice 
production. 
￿  Create a friendly business environment with new investors and not concentrate on 
immediate revenue gains but rather, longer term benefits such as sustainable 
employment.  
￿  Provide leadership and a clear strategic focus to set targets in agriculture and select three 
core products and focus finances, training and industry development towards meeting 
targets.  
￿  Fiscal reforms including better management of public finances, systems & controls plus 
tax policy. 
￿  Prioritise government budget spending in L$ rather than US$ to reduce pressure on the 
L$. 
￿  The Central Bank should stimulate certain types of activity through monetary policy. 
￿  Bank financing of local and global value chains and commercial farming of short-cycle 
food crops (e.g., rice and cassava) are key to improving their fortunes.  
￿  The Investment Incentive Code should be reviewed and made more business friendly to 
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￿  There is need for transparent equivalent of the US Small Business Administration to 
build the capacity of Liberian businesses and economically empower them to more 
successfully manage their affairs in the formal economy. 
￿  More micro-finance access is needed to reduce vulnerability of marketers by increasing 
their inventory and trading capital. 
￿  Reduce corruption and improve the justice system. 
￿  Promote alternative sources of  energy production, which is necessary for job creation. 
 
 
Another suggestion made was to develop a concrete plan for economic empowerment which 
would in turn result in the promotion of sustainable enterprises and employment. This program 
has been proposed and should be considered as a means to addressing local economic 
development. It could be a useful program to improve the Liberian economy and stimulate 
employment growth through a transparent governance structure. The key components of the 
program are outlined below.  
 




￿  To improve agricultural productivity, purchasing power & food security; 
￿  To promote light industry via SME growth to stimulate jobs, incomes and skill levels thru 
value-added processing; and 





￿  7-member Board selected out of Commerce Ministry, ILO, AfDB, LBA, USAID, Oxfam 
GB, Soros Foundation, USADF, IFC, LEDFC, mining and rubber companies 
￿  Board Project Selection sub-committee for transparency.  Profitability criteria 
￿  Selection of private sector Implementing Partner through open tender process 
￿  Quarterly project selection and M&E reporting 




￿  Registered producer groups, FBOs, coops, micro-loan and savings groups (for petty 
business lending), SMEs, marketing associations, CBOs, women and youth groups 
￿  Grants and/or interest-free loans ranging from  US$ 25-100k 
￿  Applicants to demonstrate long term project sustainability 
￿  Maximum capacity building and business development period of 12-18 months 
￿  Must fit within agribusiness, light industry and micro-finance sectors 
￿  Co-financing allowed , provided no double funding of identified needs 
 
 